On Mon, Oct 05, 2026 at 11:31:46AM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote: > Hi Jarkko, > > On 10/5/26 8:54 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Fri, Oct 02, 2026 at 12:40:50PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote: > > > Determine the TPM version once in the seal and unseal paths and reuse it > > > when allocating and parsing trusted key options. This avoids redundant TPM > > > version checks. > > So this is a bit nitpicking perhaps but a patch that would just clean > > the code up a bit would not be be worth of applying. Almost anything > > that "does nothing" goes to that bin. > > > > What I'm saying is that the conclusion in the last sentence goes to > > wrong direction but luckily the change has also feasible effects that > > we care about. > > > > By caching tpm_is_tpm2() there are less fallible sites in the key > > creation process, and reduced number of roundtrips with the TPM chip. > > > > Or from blackbox perspective it reduces I/O traffic between kernel > > and the hardware platform. > > > Yes, that makes sense. Thank you for pointing this out. > > I will revise the commit message to highlight the reduced failure > surface and I/O between the kernel and the TPM, and > send v3.
And I've seen chips where every round trip is a roll of the dice as to whether the chip will become useless till next reboot, so that is a bigger win than I was first thinking. > > > Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <[email protected]> > > > Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]> > > > --- > > > Changelog: > > > > > > v2: > > > - Use bool to indicate whether the chip is TPM 2.0 in the option > > > helpers > > > > > > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 35 +++++++++-------------- > > > 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > > > b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > > > index 3ec078ca3f97..6dbce058368f 100644 > > > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > > > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > > > @@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { > > > /* can have zero or more token= options */ > > > static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > > > - struct trusted_key_options *opt) > > > + struct trusted_key_options *opt, bool is_tpm2) > > > { > > > struct trusted_key_tpm *private = opt->private; > > > substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; > > > @@ -712,13 +712,8 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > > > trusted_key_payload *pay, > > > unsigned long token_mask = 0; > > > unsigned int digest_len; > > > int i; > > > - int tpm2; > > > - > > > - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); > > > - if (tpm2 < 0) > > > - return tpm2; > > > - private->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; > > > + private->hash = is_tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; > > > if (!c) > > > return 0; > > > @@ -773,7 +768,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > > > trusted_key_payload *pay, > > > break; > > > } > > > - if (tpm2 && > > > + if (is_tpm2 && > > > private->blobauth_len <= > > > sizeof(private->blobauth)) { > > > memcpy(private->blobauth, args[0].from, > > > @@ -808,14 +803,15 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > > > trusted_key_payload *pay, > > > } > > > if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST) > > > return -EINVAL; > > > - if (!tpm2 && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1) { > > > + if (!is_tpm2 && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1) { > > > pr_info("TPM 1.x only supports > > > SHA-1.\n"); > > > return -EINVAL; > > > } > > > break; > > > case Opt_policydigest: > > > digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash]; > > > - if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len)) > > > + if (!is_tpm2 || > > > + strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len)) > > > return -EINVAL; > > > res = hex2bin(private->policydigest, > > > args[0].from, > > > digest_len); > > > @@ -824,7 +820,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > > > trusted_key_payload *pay, > > > private->policydigest_len = digest_len; > > > break; > > > case Opt_policyhandle: > > > - if (!tpm2) > > > + if (!is_tpm2) > > > return -EINVAL; > > > res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); > > > if (res < 0) > > > @@ -838,15 +834,10 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct > > > trusted_key_payload *pay, > > > return 0; > > > } > > > -static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) > > > +static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(bool is_tpm2) > > > { > > > struct trusted_key_tpm *private; > > > struct trusted_key_options *options; > > > - int tpm2; > > > - > > > - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); > > > - if (tpm2 < 0) > > > - return NULL; > > > options = kzalloc_obj(*options); > > > if (options) { > > > @@ -858,7 +849,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_options > > > *trusted_options_alloc(void) > > > kfree_sensitive(options); > > > options = NULL; > > > } else { > > > - if (!tpm2) > > > + if (!is_tpm2) > > > private->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; > > > options->private = private; > > > } > > > @@ -877,13 +868,13 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct > > > trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > > > if (tpm2 < 0) > > > return tpm2; > > > - options = trusted_options_alloc(); > > > + options = trusted_options_alloc(tpm2); > > > if (!options) > > > return -ENOMEM; > > > private = options->private; > > > - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options); > > > + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options, tpm2); > > > if (ret < 0) > > > return ret; > > > dump_options(options); > > > @@ -922,12 +913,12 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct > > > trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > > > if (tpm2 < 0) > > > return tpm2; > > > - options = trusted_options_alloc(); > > > + options = trusted_options_alloc(tpm2); > > > if (!options) > > > return -ENOMEM; > > > private = options->private; > > > - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options); > > > + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options, tpm2); > > > if (ret < 0) > > > return ret; > > > dump_options(options); > > > -- > > > 2.53.0 > > > > > Br, Jarkko > > Thanks, > Srish
