On Fri, 2012-09-07 at 11:38 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to > the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> > Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hal...@canonical.com> > --- > include/linux/security.h | 13 +++++++++++++ > kernel/module.c | 9 +++++++++ > security/capability.c | 6 ++++++ > security/security.c | 5 +++++ > 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 3dea6a9..368e539 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -693,6 +693,12 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct > security_mnt_opts *opts) > * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. > * @kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel > * Return 0 if successful. > + * @kernel_module_from_file: > + * Load a kernel module from userspace. > + * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing > + * the kernel module to load. If the module is being loaded from a blob, > + * this argument will be NULL. > + * Return 0 if permission is granted. > * @task_fix_setuid: > * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user > * identity attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter > @@ -1507,6 +1513,7 @@ struct security_operations { > int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid); > int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); > int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name); > + int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file); > int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > int flags); > int (*task_setpgid) (struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); > @@ -1764,6 +1771,7 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const > struct cred *old); > int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid); > int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); > int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); > +int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file); > int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > int flags); > int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); > @@ -2277,6 +2285,11 @@ static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char > *kmod_name) > return 0; > } > > +static inline int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > + > static inline int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, > const struct cred *old, > int flags) > diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c > index c1e446e..0ad03c4 100644 > --- a/kernel/module.c > +++ b/kernel/module.c > @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ > #include <linux/vmalloc.h> > #include <linux/elf.h> > #include <linux/proc_fs.h> > +#include <linux/security.h> > #include <linux/seq_file.h> > #include <linux/syscalls.h> > #include <linux/fcntl.h> > @@ -2430,6 +2431,10 @@ int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, > unsigned long len, > if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr))) > return -ENOEXEC; > > + err = security_kernel_module_from_file(NULL); > + if (err) > + return err; > +
For appraisal, having the security hook here is too early. We need to pass both the data and the signature. > /* Suck in entire file: we'll want most of it. */ > info->hdr = vmalloc(info->len); > if (!info->hdr) > @@ -2468,6 +2473,10 @@ int copy_module_from_fd(int fd, struct load_info *info) > if (err) > goto out; > > + err = security_kernel_module_from_file(file); > + if (err) > + goto out; > + We probably want to pass the signature here as well, for those filesystems that don't support extended attributes. Mimi > size = stat.size; > info->hdr = vmalloc(size); > if (!info->hdr) { > diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c > index 61095df..8acb304 100644 > --- a/security/capability.c > +++ b/security/capability.c > @@ -395,6 +395,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) > return 0; > } > > +static int cap_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > + > static int cap_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) > { > return 0; > @@ -967,6 +972,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations > *ops) > set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as); > set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as); > set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request); > + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_from_file); > set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid); > set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setpgid); > set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getpgid); > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 860aeb3..f7f8695 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -799,6 +799,11 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) > return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name); > } > > +int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) > +{ > + return security_ops->kernel_module_from_file(file); > +} > + > int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > int flags) > { -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/