On 11.12.2012 13:33:04, +0100, Stephan Mueller <smuel...@chronox.de> wrote:
Hi,
I just noticed a misuse of a variable in my initial patch
> + if (r->limit == 2 && r->entropy_count >= r->poolinfo->poolwords)
Instead of r->entropy_count, the code should use entropy_count.
Please see new patch attached.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smuel...@chronox.de>
---
diff -purN linux-3.6/drivers/char/random.c
linux-3.6-sm/drivers/char/random.c
--- linux-3.6/drivers/char/random.c 2012-10-01 01:47:46.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-3.6-sm/drivers/char/random.c 2012-12-12 11:06:23.443403746
+0100
@@ -404,11 +404,12 @@ static bool debug;
module_param(debug, bool, 0644);
#define DEBUG_ENT(fmt, arg...) do { \
if (debug) \
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "random %04d %04d %04d: " \
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "random %04d %04d %04d %04d: " \
fmt,\
input_pool.entropy_count,\
blocking_pool.entropy_count,\
nonblocking_pool.entropy_count,\
+ kernel_pool.entropy_count,\
## arg); } while (0)
#else
#define DEBUG_ENT(fmt, arg...) do {} while (0)
@@ -428,7 +429,11 @@ struct entropy_store {
__u32 *pool;
const char *name;
struct entropy_store *pull;
- int limit;
+ int limit; /* 0 -> no limit when extracting data (nonblocking)
+ * 1 -> limit extracted data based on entropy counter
+ * 2 -> no limit when extracting data and disabling
+ * use of seed source once pool has full entropy
+ */
/* read-write data: */
spinlock_t lock;
@@ -443,6 +448,7 @@ struct entropy_store {
static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS];
static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
static __u32 nonblocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
+static __u32 kernel_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
.poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],
@@ -469,6 +475,15 @@ static struct entropy_store nonblocking_
.pool = nonblocking_pool_data
};
+static struct entropy_store kernel_pool = {
+ .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1],
+ .name = "kernel",
+ .limit = 2,
+ .pull = &input_pool,
+ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(&kernel_pool.lock),
+ .pool = kernel_pool_data
+};
+
static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
@@ -613,6 +628,15 @@ retry:
r->initialized = 1;
}
+ /*
+ * An entropy pool that is marked with limit 2 will only be
+ * seeded by the input_pool until it is full of entropy.
+ */
+ if (r->limit == 2 && entropy_count >= r->poolinfo->poolwords)
+ {
+ r->pull = NULL;
+ }
+
trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits, entropy_count,
r->entropy_total, _RET_IP_);
@@ -652,6 +676,8 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *b
mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time), NULL);
mix_pool_bytes(&nonblocking_pool, buf, size, NULL);
mix_pool_bytes(&nonblocking_pool, &time, sizeof(time), NULL);
+ mix_pool_bytes(&kernel_pool, buf, size, NULL);
+ mix_pool_bytes(&kernel_pool, &time, sizeof(time), NULL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
@@ -820,7 +846,7 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct e
if (r->pull && r->entropy_count < nbytes * 8 &&
r->entropy_count < r->poolinfo->POOLBITS) {
/* If we're limited, always leave two wakeup worth's BITS */
- int rsvd = r->limit ? 0 : random_read_wakeup_thresh/4;
+ int rsvd = r->limit == 1 ? 0 : random_read_wakeup_thresh/4;
int bytes = nbytes;
/* pull at least as many as BYTES as wakeup BITS */
@@ -868,7 +894,7 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_sto
nbytes = 0;
} else {
/* If limited, never pull more than available */
- if (r->limit && nbytes + reserved >= r->entropy_count / 8)
+ if (r->limit == 1 && nbytes + reserved >= r->entropy_count / 8)
nbytes = r->entropy_count/8 - reserved;
if (r->entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes + reserved)
@@ -883,7 +909,7 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_sto
}
DEBUG_ENT("debiting %d entropy credits from %s%s\n",
- nbytes * 8, r->name, r->limit ? "" : " (unlimited)");
+ nbytes * 8, r->name, r->limit == 1 ? "" : " (unlimited)");
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
@@ -1037,6 +1063,21 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nby
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
/*
+ * This function exports the kernel random number pool. It is of
+ * slightly less quality than the nonblocking_pool exported by
+ * the function get_random_bytes because once it is filled completely
+ * with entropy, it is never seeded again. Yet, the quality of the
+ * random bytes depend on the SHA-1 hash and should be sufficient
+ * for purposes like ASLR and stack protection.
+ */
+void get_random_kernel_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+{
+ extract_entropy(&kernel_pool, buf, nbytes, 0, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_kernel_bytes);
+
+
+/*
* This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
* number generator if it is available. The arch-specific hw RNG will
* almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it
@@ -1110,6 +1151,7 @@ static int rand_initialize(void)
init_std_data(&input_pool);
init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
init_std_data(&nonblocking_pool);
+ init_std_data(&kernel_pool);
return 0;
}
module_init(rand_initialize);
@@ -1239,6 +1281,9 @@ static ssize_t random_write(struct file
ret = write_pool(&nonblocking_pool, buffer, count);
if (ret)
return ret;
+ ret = write_pool(&kernel_pool, buffer, count);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
return (ssize_t)count;
}
diff -purN linux-3.6/fs/binfmt_elf.c linux-3.6-sm/fs/binfmt_elf.c
--- linux-3.6/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2012-10-01 01:47:46.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-3.6-sm/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2012-12-11 10:25:36.357094685 +0100
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *b
/*
* Generate 16 random bytes for userspace PRNG seeding.
*/
- get_random_bytes(k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes));
+ get_random_kernel_bytes(k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes));
u_rand_bytes = (elf_addr_t __user *)
STACK_ALLOC(p, sizeof(k_rand_bytes));
if (__copy_to_user(u_rand_bytes, k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes)))
diff -purN linux-3.6/include/linux/random.h
linux-3.6-sm/include/linux/random.h
--- linux-3.6/include/linux/random.h 2012-10-01 01:47:46.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-3.6-sm/include/linux/random.h 2012-12-11 10:31:45.033100217
+0100
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ extern void add_input_randomness(unsigne
extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);
extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+extern void get_random_kernel_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16]);
--
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