Il 17/12/2012 15:27, Paolo Bonzini ha scritto: > Il 13/11/2012 18:25, Paolo Bonzini ha scritto: >> > Privilege restrictions for SG_IO right now apply without distinction to >> > all devices, based on the single capability CAP_SYS_RAWIO. This is a very >> > broad capability, and makes it difficult to give SG_IO access to trusted >> > clients that need access to persistent reservations, trim/discard, or >> > vendor-specific commands. One problem here is that CAP_SYS_RAWIO allows >> > to escape a partition and issue commands that affect the full disk, >> > thus making DAC almost useless. >> > >> > For simplicity, this series attempts to solve one case only: you want >> > to pass through almost everything, but still run as confined as possible. >> > This is for example the case for virtualization, where more complex >> > filtering can be done just as easily in userspace, in the virtual >> > machine monitor. (This does mean the filter can be subverted if the >> > guest can escape the QEMU jail, but a more generic approach involving >> > a bitmap was NACKed). >> > >> > Ok for 3.8? > Ping... Jens, I haven't seen any pull request for 3.8 from you. Are > these patches on your radar? Tejun acked both of them.
Ping^2. Paolo -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
