On Thu, 21 Feb 2013, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > > b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > > index 4adcd0f..23f49e3 100644
> > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > > @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
> > > #include <linux/magic.h>
> > > #include <linux/parser.h>
> > > #include <linux/slab.h>
> > > +#include <linux/genhd.h>
> > >
> > > #include "ima.h"
> > >
> > > @@ -25,6 +26,7 @@
> > > #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
> > > #define IMA_UID 0x0008
> > > #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
> > > +#define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
> > >
> > > #define UNKNOWN 0
> > > #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
> > > @@ -45,6 +47,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
> > > enum ima_hooks func;
> > > int mask;
> > > unsigned long fsmagic;
> > > + u8 fsuuid[16];
> > > kuid_t uid;
> > > kuid_t fowner;
> > > struct {
> > > @@ -172,6 +175,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry
> > > *rule,
> > > if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
> > > && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
> > > return false;
> > > + if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
> > > + memcmp(rule->fsuuid, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(rule->fsuuid)))
> > > + return false;
> > > if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
> > > return false;
> > > if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
> > > @@ -346,7 +352,7 @@ enum {
> > > Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
> > > Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
> > > Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
> > > - Opt_appraise_type
> > > + Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid
> > > };
> > >
> > > static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> > > @@ -364,6 +370,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> > > {Opt_func, "func=%s"},
> > > {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
> > > {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
> > > + {Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
> > > {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
> > > {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
> > > {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
> > > @@ -519,6 +526,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct
> > > ima_rule_entry *entry)
> > > if (!result)
> > > entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
> > > break;
> > > + case Opt_fsuuid:
> > > + ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
> > > +
> > > + if (memchr_inv(entry->fsuuid, 0x00,
> > > + sizeof(entry->fsuuid))) {
> > > + result = -EINVAL;
> > > + break;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + part_pack_uuid(args[0].from, entry->fsuuid);
> > > + entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID;
> > > + result = 0;
> > > + break;
> > > case Opt_uid:
> > > ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
> > >
> >
> > We don't have part_pack_uuid() without CONFIG_BLOCK, so should this return
> > -ENOTSUPP if that option is not enabled?
>
> Yes, this problem showed up in Randy's randconfig. He suggested moving
> part_pack_uuid() outside of the "ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK" to always make it
> visible - http://marc.info/?l=linux-next&m=136139276002173&w=2.
>
Who's pushing this to linux-next?
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
