On Thu, 28 Feb 2013, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > Sure, if you've been infected before the revocation, you'll still be > > > infected. There's not really any good way around that. > > > > Which is a very substantial difference to normal X509 chain of trust, > > isn't it? > > If you've loaded an x.509 certificate into the kernel and it's later > revoked, any module signed with the key is going to be loadable until > it's revoked. I don't see an especially large difference here?
i_own_your_ring0.ko can be modprobed long after blacklisting of "hello world" binary hash has happened on the very particular machine in its dbx (as there is no link, in a x509-chain-of-trust-sense, between the hash of the PE binary and the i_own_your_ring0.ko signature key). modprobe of a module signed by a key that has been blacklisted on the very particular machine in its dbx is not going to work (as there is a very direct x509 chain of trust link). No? Thanks, -- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
