From: Mark Grondona <mgrond...@llnl.gov>
__ptrace_may_access() checks get_dumpable/ptrace_has_cap/etc
if task != current, this can can lead to surprising results.
For example, a sub-thread can't readlink("/proc/self/exe") if
the executable is not readable. setup_new_exec()->would_dump()
notices that inode_permission(MAY_READ) fails and then it does
set_dumpable(suid_dumpable). After that get_dumpable() fails.
(It is not clear why proc_pid_readlink() checks get_dumpable(),
perhaps we could add PTRACE_MODE_NODUMPABLE)
Change __ptrace_may_access() to use same_thread_group() instead
of "task == current". Any security check is pointless when the
tasks share the same ->mm.
Signed-off-by: Mark Grondona <mgrond...@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Ben Woodard <wood...@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <o...@redhat.com>
---
kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index a146ee3..dd562e9 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned int mode)
*/
int dumpable = 0;
/* Don't let security modules deny introspection */
- if (task == current)
+ if (same_thread_group(task, current))
return 0;
rcu_read_lock();
tcred = __task_cred(task);
--
1.5.5.1
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