Unfixed checkpatch errors make it difficult to see new errors.. This patch fix them. Some lines with over 80 chars remained unchanged to improve code readability.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <[email protected]> --- security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 28 +++++++------- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 4 +- security/integrity/iint.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 6 +-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++------------------ security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 4 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 14 +++---- security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 4 +- 11 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index 30bd1ec..37c88dd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -32,19 +32,19 @@ extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */ extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[]; -extern int evm_init_key(void); -extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *req_xattr_name, - const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len); -extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, - const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); -extern int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, - const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); -extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr, - char *hmac_val); -extern int evm_init_secfs(void); +int evm_init_key(void); +int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, + size_t req_xattr_value_len); +int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); +int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); +int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr, + char *hmac_val); +int evm_init_secfs(void); #endif diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 9bd329f..babd862 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -105,13 +105,13 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, umode_t mode; } hmac_misc; - memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc); + memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc)); hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid); hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; - crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc); + crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc)); if (evm_hmac_version > 1) crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid)); diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index c49d3f1..a521edf 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo; - memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint); + memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint)); iint->version = 0; iint->flags = 0UL; iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 393b9d4..c6b4a73 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -160,10 +160,10 @@ err_out: * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK) * * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: - * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= + * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. - * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK - * mask: contains the permission mask + * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK + * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * We only get here if the inode has not already been measured, * but the measurement could already exist: - * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or + * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or * different filesystems. * - the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info, * containing the hashing info. diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index 9999057..d257e36 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. * * File: ima_crypto.c - * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash + * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 468a3ba..da92fcc 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -133,14 +133,14 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) * PCR used is always the same (config option) in * little-endian format */ - ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr); + ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(pcr)); /* 2nd: template digest */ ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); /* 3rd: template name size */ namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name); - ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen); + ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen)); /* 4th: template name */ ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen); @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1); /* * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file */ -static int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp) +static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { /* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */ if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 149ee11..50413d0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -71,10 +71,10 @@ __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup); * ima_rdwr_violation_check * * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files: - * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, + * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. * - Opening a file for read when already open for write, - * could result in a file measurement error. + * could result in a file measurement error. * */ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 947cdbe..41021b4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. * * ima_policy.c - * - initialize default measure policy rules + * - initialize default measure policy rules * */ #include <linux/module.h> @@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ #include "ima.h" /* flags definitions */ -#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001 -#define IMA_MASK 0x0002 +#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001 +#define IMA_MASK 0x0002 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004 #define IMA_UID 0x0008 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010 @@ -69,35 +69,35 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { * and running executables. */ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = { - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = MMAP_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, }; static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = { - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER}, }; static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules); @@ -122,12 +122,12 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str) } __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup); -/* +/* * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old, * stale LSM policy. * - * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy. + * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy. * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't. */ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ retry: retried = 1; ima_lsm_update_rules(); goto retry; - } + } if (!rc) return false; } @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func) if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC)) return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE; - switch(func) { + switch (func) { case MMAP_CHECK: return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE; case BPRM_CHECK: @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0; appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0; - + for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) { if (i < measure_entries) list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, @@ -522,8 +522,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) break; } - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, - &entry->fsmagic); + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic); if (!result) entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC; break; @@ -549,7 +548,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) break; } - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); if (!result) { entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum); if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum)) @@ -566,7 +565,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) break; } - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); if (!result) { entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum); if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum)) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c index 91128b4..552705d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex); if (!violation) { - memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof digest); + memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof(digest)); if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) { audit_cause = "hash_exists"; result = -EEXIST; @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, } if (violation) /* invalidate pcr */ - memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof digest); + memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof(digest)); tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest); if (tpmresult != 0) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index 9a4a0d1..a076a96 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -22,20 +22,20 @@ static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = { {.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT}, - {.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"}, - {.name = "ima-sig",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"}, + {.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"}, + {.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"}, }; static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = { - {.field_id = "d",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_init, + {.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_digest}, - {.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init, + {.field_id = "n", .field_init = ima_eventname_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_string}, - {.field_id = "d-ng",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init, + {.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng}, - {.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init, + {.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_string}, - {.field_id = "sig",.field_init = ima_eventsig_init, + {.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, }; diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c index 793d7be..aab9fa5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c +++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. * * File: integrity_audit.c - * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem + * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem */ #include <linux/fs.h> @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static int __init integrity_audit_setup(char *str) { unsigned long audit; - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit)) + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &audit)) integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0; return 1; } -- 1.8.3.2 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
