Provide API to load x509 certificates from the kernel into the
integrity kernel keyrings.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <[email protected]>
---
 security/integrity/Kconfig     |  4 +++
 security/integrity/digsig.c    | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/integrity.h | 10 ++++++
 3 files changed, 86 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 89f226a..8f34b28 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ config INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
        def_bool n
        depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING || EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 
+config INTEGRITY_LOAD_X509
+       def_bool n
+       depends on IMA_LOAD_X509 || EVM_LOAD_X509
+
 source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
 source security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 45adc07..cba38e3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 #include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
 #include <linux/digsig.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
 
 #include "integrity.h"
 
@@ -59,6 +61,76 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const 
char *sig, int siglen,
        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_LOAD_X509
+int integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data)
+{
+       struct file *file;
+       loff_t size;
+       char *buf;
+       int rc =  -EINVAL;
+
+       file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
+       if (IS_ERR(file))
+               return PTR_ERR(file);
+
+       size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+       if (size <= 0)
+               goto out;
+
+       buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!buf) {
+               rc = -ENOMEM;
+               goto out;
+       }
+
+       rc = kernel_read(file, 0, buf, size);
+       if (rc < 0)
+               kfree(buf);
+       else if (rc != size)
+               rc = -EIO;
+       else
+               *data = buf;
+out:
+       fput(file);
+       return rc;
+}
+
+int integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path)
+{
+       key_ref_t key;
+       char *data;
+       int rc;
+
+       if (!keyring[id])
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       rc = integrity_read_file(path, &data);
+       if (rc < 0)
+               return rc;
+
+       key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1),
+                                  "asymmetric",
+                                  NULL,
+                                  data,
+                                  rc,
+                                  ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+                                  KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
+                                  KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
+                                  KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED);
+       if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+               rc = PTR_ERR(key);
+               pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate (%d): %s\n",
+                      rc, path);
+       } else {
+               pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s': %s\n",
+                         key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description, path);
+               key_ref_put(key);
+       }
+       kfree(data);
+       return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 {
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index dd26ad0..96960fb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -146,6 +146,16 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, 
const char *sig,
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_LOAD_X509
+int integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data);
+int integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path);
+#else
+static inline int integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path)
+{
+       return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
 #else
-- 
1.8.3.2

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