On 11 June 2014 00:00, Dmitry Kasatkin <[email protected]> wrote: > On 10 June 2014 23:40, Matthew Garrett <[email protected]> wrote: >> On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 11:34:17PM +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote: >> >>> Preventing loading keys from uefi except dbx by default actually improves >>> security. Adding kernel parameter to read db we make system more >>> vulnerable. >> >> It only adds security if you're performing a measured boot and remote >> attestation. Otherwise you implicitly trust that key anyway. In almost >> all cases refusing to trust db gives you a false sense of security >> without any real improvement. I don't think it's obvious it should be >> the default. >> >> -- >> Matthew Garrett | [email protected] > > May be you are right... "in almost all cases"... > > It does not mater if one trust DB or not... It's all about > distro/system configuration... > > Normal user even will not know what is default behavior and what > kernel parameter disables or enables... > And distro will have it by default or will use kernel parameter... It > does not change anything... > > I am just discussing kernel configuration... > Without kind of looking to it I cannot be sure if UEFI keys will > appear on system keyring or not. > Now I have to be aware how kernel is compiled... If it is compiled > with CONFIG_KEYS_UEFI or so > I need to remember may be to supply addition kernel parameters to > limit key UEFI usage... > > It is may be not a big deal... > > -- > Thanks, > Dmitry
It is probably just a paranoia... Kconfig MODULE_SIG_UEFI should tell about threat of loading kernel modules from NSA or Lenovo signed by MS or Lenovo keys.. This hole is opened without warning... :) -- Thanks, Dmitry -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
