Jake Moilanen writes: > diff -puN fs/binfmt_elf.c~nx-user-ppc64 fs/binfmt_elf.c > --- linux-2.6-bk/fs/binfmt_elf.c~nx-user-ppc64 2005-03-08 16:08:54 > -06:00 > +++ linux-2.6-bk-moilanen/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2005-03-08 16:08:54 -06:00 > @@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ static int set_brk(unsigned long start, > up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); > if (BAD_ADDR(addr)) > return addr; > + > + sys_mprotect(start, end-start, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC);
I don't think I can push that upstream. What happens if you leave that out? More generally, we are making a user-visible change, even for programs that aren't marked as having non-executable stack or heap, because we are now enforcing that the program can't execute from mappings that don't have PROT_EXEC. Perhaps we should enforce the requirement for execute permission only on those programs that indicate somehow that they can handle it? Paul. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/