On Sat, 1 Nov 2014, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 1, 2014 at 12:59 PM, Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Fri, 24 Oct 2014, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >
> > I'm probably missing something.
> >
> > Why is this tied to the mmap? If I just open a counter then I should
> > be able to read the counter from user space w/o mmapping something in
> > the first place.
>
> You can read it with read(2), which this patch shouldn't affect. If
> you want to read it with rdpmc, then you need to know what rdpmc index
> to use, and the API for that is to mmap the event, check the
> userpage's cap_user_rdpmc, and then rdpmc on ->idx - 1 (assuming that
> ->idx != 0). You can't safely make any assumptions about which rdpmc
> index it will be without explicitly checking, because perf reserves
> the right to change the index whenever it wants.
Got it. As I expected: I was missing something :)
> There's plenty of room to tighten up the restrictions further, but
> this is, I think, a decent first step, and it solves the problem of
> information leaking into seccomp sandboxes.
In which way?
Thanks,
tglx
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