On 03/11/2015 06:42 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote: > Subject: [PATCH 8/7 v21] LSM: Fixes for issues found in review > > Correct capability hook uses that hadn't been done properly in the 6/7 patch. > > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> > Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> > > --- > > security/apparmor/domain.c | 8 +++----- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 15 +-------------- > 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c > index b09fff7..dc0027b 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c > @@ -529,15 +529,13 @@ cleanup: > */ > int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > { > - int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm); > - > /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds > * and stored in bprm->unsafe. > */ > - if (!ret && (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED)) > - ret = 1; > + if (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED) > + return 1; Not your fault but for the AA folks, I think this is a layering violation; security modules shouldn't directly set bits in brpm->unsafe as they could be used at any time by the core kernel; we have our own bprm->security field for any module-private flags. If there was a general need for such a flag, it should be defined with the rest of the unsafe flags so that it is properly reserved. > > - return ret; > + return 0; > } > > /** > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index 3fd8610..e71c797 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -2008,7 +2008,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct > *parent) > static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t > *effective, > kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) > { > - return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); > + return current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP); > } > > static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > @@ -2016,13 +2016,6 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const > struct cred *old, > const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, > const kernel_cap_t *permitted) > { > - int error; > - > - error = cap_capset(new, old, > - effective, inheritable, permitted); > - if (error) > - return error; > - > return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP); > } > > @@ -2039,12 +2032,6 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const > struct cred *old, > static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace > *ns, > int cap, int audit) > { > - int rc; > - > - rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit); > - if (rc) > - return rc; > - > return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit); > } > > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
