On 04/29/2015 08:39 AM, Shawn Chang wrote:
From: Shawn C <[email protected]>
Hi kernel maintainers,
It won't allow the address above the TASK_SIZE being mmap'ed( or mprotect'ed).
This patch is from PaX/Grsecurity.
Thanks for your review time!
Does this actually reduce the attack surface of anything?
These functions all search for vmas. If there's a vma outside of the
user range, we have a problem.
Also, that use of TASK_SIZE is IMO ridiculous. Shouldn't be TASK_SIZE_MAX?
--Andy, who is annoyed every time another pointless TIF_IA32 reference,
even hidden in a macro, makes it into the kernel
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