Provide stubs for union/overlay copy-up handling.  The xattr copy up stub
discards lower SELinux xattrs rather than letting them be copied up so that
the security label on the copy doesn't get corrupted.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
---

 security/selinux/hooks.c |   20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e4369d86e588..7c1a44d9fac3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3190,6 +3190,24 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode 
*inode, u32 *secid)
        *secid = isec->sid;
 }
 
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst)
+{
+       return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst,
+                                      const char *name, void *value,
+                                      size_t *size)
+{
+       /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
+        * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
+        * xattrs up.  Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
+        */
+       if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
+               return 1; /* Discard */
+       return 0;
+}
+
 /* file security operations */
 
 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -5919,6 +5937,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
 
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),

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