From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>

It is unlikely that application calls mm syscall, such as mprotect,
on already sealed mappings, adding branch prediction hint.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Pedro Falcato <[email protected]>
---
 mm/madvise.c  | 2 +-
 mm/mmap.c     | 4 ++--
 mm/mprotect.c | 2 +-
 mm/mremap.c   | 4 ++--
 mm/mseal.c    | 6 +++---
 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c
index f7d589534e82..ea2e4f6981e2 100644
--- a/mm/madvise.c
+++ b/mm/madvise.c
@@ -1442,7 +1442,7 @@ int do_madvise(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, 
size_t len_in, int beh
         * Check if the address range is sealed for do_madvise().
         * can_modify_mm_madv assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
         */
-       if (!can_modify_mm_madv(mm, start, end, behavior)) {
+       if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm_madv(mm, start, end, behavior))) {
                error = -EPERM;
                goto out;
        }
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 4b80076c319e..6bc0b35ee1f9 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -2697,7 +2697,7 @@ int do_vmi_munmap(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct 
mm_struct *mm,
         * Prevent unmapping a sealed VMA.
         * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
         */
-       if (!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end))
+       if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end)))
                return -EPERM;
 
         /* arch_unmap() might do unmaps itself.  */
@@ -3120,7 +3120,7 @@ int do_vma_munmap(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct 
vm_area_struct *vma,
         * Prevent unmapping a sealed VMA.
         * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
         */
-       if (!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end))
+       if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end)))
                return -EPERM;
 
        arch_unmap(mm, start, end);
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index b30b2494bfcd..465c6cd9578c 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
         * checking if memory is sealed.
         * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
         */
-       if (!can_modify_mm(current->mm, start, end)) {
+       if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(current->mm, start, end))) {
                error = -EPERM;
                goto out;
        }
diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c
index d69b438dcf83..223552901f14 100644
--- a/mm/mremap.c
+++ b/mm/mremap.c
@@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ static unsigned long mremap_to(unsigned long addr, unsigned 
long old_len,
         *
         * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
         */
-       if (!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len))
+       if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len)))
                return -EPERM;
 
        if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) {
@@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned 
long, old_len,
         * Place can_modify_mm here so we can keep the logic related to
         * shrink/expand together.
         */
-       if (!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len)) {
+       if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len))) {
                ret = -EPERM;
                goto out;
        }
diff --git a/mm/mseal.c b/mm/mseal.c
index daadac4b8125..bf783bba8ed0 100644
--- a/mm/mseal.c
+++ b/mm/mseal.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline void set_vma_sealed(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
  */
 static bool can_modify_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
-       if (vma_is_sealed(vma))
+       if (unlikely(vma_is_sealed(vma)))
                return false;
 
        return true;
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ bool can_modify_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, 
unsigned long end)
 
        /* going through each vma to check. */
        for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) {
-               if (!can_modify_vma(vma))
+               if (unlikely(!can_modify_vma(vma)))
                        return false;
        }
 
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ bool can_modify_mm_madv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long 
start, unsigned long
 
        /* going through each vma to check. */
        for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end)
-               if (is_ro_anon(vma) && !can_modify_vma(vma))
+               if (unlikely(is_ro_anon(vma) && !can_modify_vma(vma)))
                        return false;
 
        /* Allow by default. */
-- 
2.44.0.769.g3c40516874-goog


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