2026-07-26, 20:33:37 -0400, Chuck Lever wrote: > Nothing in this file splices a socket whose last decrypt failed, so > the check that fails tls_sw_splice_read() on a broken connection can > be removed without a test noticing. Such a splice hands the > application plaintext that recvmsg() and read_sock() already refuse > to return. > > Extend the bad_auth pattern: corrupt an authenticated record, confirm > recvmsg() reports EBADMSG, then splice the same socket and require > EBADMSG again. A synchronous decrypt fails again on the still-queued > record, so only an asynchronous decrypt, which needs TLS 1.2 and an > AEAD advertising CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, reaches EBADMSG solely through the > recorded-failure check.
async crypto is going away soon, I don't think it's worth mentioning it. (but first I'm finishing the surgery to get rid of skmsg) > bad_auth builds the same corrupted record, so its construction moves > into a helper the two tests share. > > Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <[email protected]> > --- > tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c | 77 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c > b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c > index 7c178541edf4..8b68dbfcc592 100644 > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c > @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ > #include "kselftest_harness.h" > > #define TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN 16384 > +#define TLS_HDR_LEN 5 > #define SOL_TLS 282 > > static int fips_enabled; > @@ -2883,28 +2884,85 @@ TEST_F(tls_err, bad_rec) > EXPECT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN); > } > > +/* Encrypt a record on the TX-only socket pair, corrupt its last > + * byte, and hand the result to the socket under test. cfd carries a > + * byte stream, so one recv() can return part of a record: take the > + * fragment length from the record header and wait for the remainder. > + */ I'm not a fan of adding a 5-line comment for every 10-line function. [...] > +TEST_F(tls_err, bad_auth_splice) > +{ > + char buf[128]; > + ssize_t ret; > + int p[2]; > + > + if (self->notls) > + SKIP(return, "no TLS support"); > + > + tls_send_bad_auth(_metadata, self->fd, self->cfd, self->fd2); > + > + EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd2, buf, sizeof(buf), 0), -1); > + EXPECT_EQ(errno, EBADMSG); > + > + ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0); > + > + ret = splice(self->cfd2, NULL, p[1], NULL, sizeof(buf), > + SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK); > + EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1); > + if (ret == -1) nit: The rest of the tls tests just check errno when an error was expected. If we didn't get -1, the errno check will probably fail too, but at this point the test has already failed so IMO it's not worth adding extra conditionals. > + EXPECT_EQ(errno, EBADMSG); > + > + close(p[0]); > + close(p[1]); > +} -- Sabrina
