On Tue, 2010-02-16 at 00:19 +0100, davide89v wrote: > "It can't limit what you do [...]. It needs non-free software to do > that." > This is not true > http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html > http://www.eema.org/downloads/security_articles/trusted_computing.pdf > http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/08/trusted_computi.html > http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0208.html#1
I didn't open the PDF, but the crypto-gram article and Scheier.com blog post are talking about a Microsoft system, and the FAQ doesn't mention anything but non-free software. > > TC can control everything. > http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/trusted_computing > Do you have any evidence? That link is just a marketing chart - the axes are "trusted systems" and "solution value". I find it very hard to believe that a chip on a motherboard that does not have knowledge of what I am executing could somehow change or alter what I am executing. > This is not theory but reality > > http://www.wired.com/gadgets/mac/commentary/cultofmac/2005/08/68501 > http://news.cnet.com/2100-1016_3-5819211.html This article refers to Apple using a TPM to stop OS X from working on non-Apple machines. This is a red herring: the TPM doesn't "control everything"; it's queried by the kernel to verify that the machine is Apple-made. Assuming the firmware/BIOS doesn't use the TPM to verify the bootloader and kernel (which I doubt, because Apple makes it possible to compile and install your own Darwin kernel), you could remove OS X from the Apple machine with a TPM, and... nothing would happen. > http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blogs/bechtold/archives003235.shtml > This is a much shorter blog post about the same (Apple+TPM) event. > Also this "[...] TPMs that we know we control." is false because when > will be available only trusted system? Is that meant to say "this ... is false because when TPMS are available, they will only be available on fully trusted systems."? Because that is false - there are TPM's everywhere now, and they aren't even pre-loaded with an unremovable key. > > http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/solutions/network_security > This page is about how you can use TPMs in software systems for authenticating computers on a network. This is a red herring as well, because the TPM alone isn't doing all of this in binary blog firmware - software running in user and kernel space on the operating system is doing it. If you don't run that non-free software, it can't do anything. The TPM is just like any other peripheral. It can only do what client code tells it to do. > It is naive to use the TC for good benefits, because they are born for > to violate our security and slowly in silence the hardware and software > vendors are filling the world of trusted systems > This isn't a good thing, because most people use non-free software that can abuse the TPM. But with free software, there's nothing to worry about. > [6] http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ID/10441443 > http://www.chillingeffects.org/weather.cgi?WeatherID=534 These are articles about the same event (the second references the first): most manufacturers installing TPMs. This was in 2006, and the world has not ended, nor has GNU/Linux been outlawed. The bottom line is, a TPM cannot control what the CPU executes. The CPU can ask it to verify a signature, and it can say "this is a valid signature" or "this is an invalid signature", but what the CPU does from there is up to the CPU. If the CPU is running non-free software written by an unethical person, it could tell the user "sorry, but you can't install your own OS/copy that floppy/do that dave". If the CPU is running free software, it can do anything the user tells it to. Treacherous computing is worth opposing, because non-free software purveyors can do things like making it impossible (or at least difficult) to install GNU/Linux and other free software systems in place of proprietary ones, and it will cause harm to the many millions of people who do not use free software. But it is not worth removing from linux-libre, because with free software, we can use the TPM for our own purposes, because we control the software running on the CPU.
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