Add support to issue a secure erase DSM to the Intel nvdimm. The
required passphrase is acquired from userspace through the kernel key
management. To trigger the action, "erase <old_keyid>" is written to the
"security" sysfs attribute. libnvdimm will support the erase generic API
call. The user key provided will be verified against the cached kernel
key. If no kernel key exists, then the user key will be attempted for the
operation.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.ji...@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.willi...@intel.com>
---
drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/libnvdimm.h | 3 ++
3 files changed, 135 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c b/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c
index ba886f1f5399..419a7d54d4e8 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c
@@ -18,6 +18,63 @@
#include "intel.h"
#include "nfit.h"
+static int intel_dimm_security_erase(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus,
+ struct nvdimm *nvdimm, const struct nvdimm_key_data *nkey)
+{
+ struct nvdimm_bus_descriptor *nd_desc = to_nd_desc(nvdimm_bus);
+ int cmd_rc, rc = 0;
+ struct nfit_mem *nfit_mem = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm);
+ struct {
+ struct nd_cmd_pkg pkg;
+ struct nd_intel_secure_erase cmd;
+ } nd_cmd = {
+ .pkg = {
+ .nd_command = NVDIMM_INTEL_SECURE_ERASE,
+ .nd_family = NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL,
+ .nd_size_in = ND_INTEL_PASSPHRASE_SIZE,
+ .nd_size_out = ND_INTEL_STATUS_SIZE,
+ .nd_fw_size = ND_INTEL_STATUS_SIZE,
+ },
+ .cmd = {
+ .status = 0,
+ },
+ };
+
+ if (!test_bit(NVDIMM_INTEL_SECURE_ERASE, &nfit_mem->dsm_mask))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ /* flush all cache before we erase DIMM */
+ wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+ memcpy(nd_cmd.cmd.passphrase, nkey->data,
+ sizeof(nd_cmd.cmd.passphrase));
+ rc = nd_desc->ndctl(nd_desc, nvdimm, ND_CMD_CALL, &nd_cmd,
+ sizeof(nd_cmd), &cmd_rc);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (cmd_rc < 0) {
+ rc = cmd_rc;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ switch (nd_cmd.cmd.status) {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case ND_INTEL_STATUS_INVALID_PASS:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ case ND_INTEL_STATUS_INVALID_STATE:
+ default:
+ rc = -ENXIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* DIMM erased, invalidate all CPU caches before we read it */
+ wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+
+ out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int intel_dimm_security_freeze_lock(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus,
struct nvdimm *nvdimm)
{
@@ -321,4 +378,5 @@ const struct nvdimm_security_ops intel_security_ops = {
.change_key = intel_dimm_security_update_passphrase,
.disable = intel_dimm_security_disable,
.freeze_lock = intel_dimm_security_freeze_lock,
+ .erase = intel_dimm_security_erase,
};
diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c b/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c
index 75a3f841a7ce..752149c9450c 100644
--- a/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c
+++ b/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c
@@ -183,6 +183,77 @@ int nvdimm_security_get_state(struct device *dev)
&nvdimm->state);
}
+static int nvdimm_security_erase(struct device *dev, unsigned int keyid)
+{
+ struct nvdimm *nvdimm = to_nvdimm(dev);
+ struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus = walk_to_nvdimm_bus(dev);
+ struct key *key;
+ struct user_key_payload *payload;
+ int rc = 0;
+ bool is_userkey = false;
+
+ if (!nvdimm->security_ops)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ nvdimm_bus_lock(&nvdimm_bus->dev);
+ if (atomic_read(&nvdimm->busy)) {
+ dev_warn(dev, "Unable to secure erase while DIMM active.\n");
+ rc = -EBUSY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (dev_get_drvdata(dev)) {
+ dev_warn(dev, "Unable to secure erase while DIMM enabled.\n");
+ rc = -EBUSY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (nvdimm->state == NVDIMM_SECURITY_UNSUPPORTED) {
+ dev_warn(dev, "Attempt to secure erase in wrong state.\n");
+ rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* look for a key from keyring if exists and remove */
+ key = nvdimm_get_and_verify_key(dev, keyid);
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ dev_dbg(dev, "Unable to get and verify key\n");
+ rc = PTR_ERR(key);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!key) {
+ dev_dbg(dev, "No cached key found\n");
+ /* get old user key */
+ key = nvdimm_lookup_user_key(dev, keyid);
+ if (!key) {
+ dev_dbg(dev, "Unable to retrieve user key: %d\n",
+ keyid);
+ rc = -ENOKEY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ is_userkey = true;
+ }
+
+ down_read(&key->sem);
+ payload = key->payload.data[0];
+ rc = nvdimm->security_ops->erase(nvdimm_bus, nvdimm,
+ (void *)payload->data);
+ up_read(&key->sem);
+ /* remove key since secure erase kills the passphrase */
+
+ if (!is_userkey) {
+ key_unlink(nvdimm_keyring, key);
+ key_invalidate(key);
+ nvdimm->key = NULL;
+ }
+ key_put(key);
+
+ out:
+ nvdimm_bus_unlock(&nvdimm_bus->dev);
+ nvdimm_security_get_state(dev);
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int nvdimm_security_freeze_lock(struct device *dev)
{
struct nvdimm *nvdimm = to_nvdimm(dev);
@@ -817,6 +888,9 @@ static ssize_t security_store(struct device *dev,
} else if (sysfs_streq(buf, "freeze")) {
dev_dbg(dev, "freeze\n");
rc = nvdimm_security_freeze_lock(dev);
+ } else if (sysfs_streq(cmd, "erase")) {
+ dev_dbg(dev, "erase %u\n", old_key);
+ rc = nvdimm_security_erase(dev, old_key);
} else
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/include/linux/libnvdimm.h b/include/linux/libnvdimm.h
index bcab42caa948..0d85e092a6dd 100644
--- a/include/linux/libnvdimm.h
+++ b/include/linux/libnvdimm.h
@@ -187,6 +187,9 @@ struct nvdimm_security_ops {
const struct nvdimm_key_data *nkey);
int (*freeze_lock)(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus,
struct nvdimm *nvdimm);
+ int (*erase)(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus,
+ struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
+ const struct nvdimm_key_data *nkey);
};
void badrange_init(struct badrange *badrange);
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