On 15/08/2012 16:40, Steve Wise wrote:
On 8/15/2012 8:28 AM, Or Gerlitz wrote:
Currently, for an app to open a raw QP from user space, we (verbs)
require admin permission, for which we (Mellanox) got customer
feedback saying this is problematic on some of the environments.
Suppose we allow to user to provide source mac+vlan when creating the
QP or when modifying its state, and the HW can enforce that -- in
that case I think its OK to remove that restriction e.g ala what is
allowed today with user space UD QPs when the fabric is IB.
We have similar requirements from customers. I don't understand how
mac+vlan allows the driver to enforce anything? Can you explain this
further?
Its what's called HW anti spoofing support, very common in the
virtualization world when you want te HW to enforce source mac/vlan for
Ethernet frames sent by a VM using an SRIOV VF -- user-space is a
private case of that very same problem. Its not driver enforcement, its
driver advertizing the ability of the HW to enforce.
Or.
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