Since ib_copy_from_udata() doesn't check yet the available input data length before accessing userspace memory, an explicit check of this length is required to prevent:
- reading past the user provided buffer, - underflow when subtracting the expected command size from the input length. This will ensure the newly added flow steering uverbs don't try to process truncated commands. Link: http://marc.info/[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud <[email protected]> --- drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c index 5976d885f408..d39062466a7a 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c @@ -2649,6 +2649,9 @@ int ib_uverbs_ex_create_flow(struct ib_uverbs_file *file, void *ib_spec; int i; + if (ucore->inlen < sizeof(cmd)) + return -EINVAL; + if (ucore->outlen < sizeof(resp)) return -ENOSPC; @@ -2799,6 +2802,9 @@ int ib_uverbs_ex_destroy_flow(struct ib_uverbs_file *file, struct ib_uobject *uobj; int ret; + if (ucore->inlen < sizeof(cmd)) + return -EINVAL; + ret = ib_copy_from_udata(&cmd, ucore, sizeof(cmd)); if (ret) return ret; -- 1.8.4.2 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-rdma" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
