On 16/11/18 10:32, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 12, 2018 at 11:17:29AM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>>> Well, that's what we have the security_file_ioctl() LSM hook for so that
>>> your security model can arbitrate access to ioctls.
>>
>> Doesn't that have TOC-TOU races by design?
>
> If you want to look at the command - yes. If you just want to filter
> read vs write vs ioctl, no.
Yeah, but looking at the command is what Ted wants. The thing that we
did in RHEL was a single sysfs bool that allows unfiltered access,
because it was sort of enough and made the delta very small. But for
upstream I want to do it right, even if that means learning all that
new-fangled BPF stuff. :)
>> Also, what about SG_IO giving write access to files that are only opened
>> read-only (and only have read permissions)?
>
> Allowing SG_IO on read-only permissions sounds like a reall bad idea,
> filtering or not.
I would even agree, however it's allowed right now and I would be
surprised if no one was relying on it in good faith ("I'm just doing an
INQUIRY, why do I need to open O_RDWR"). And indeed:
$ sudo chmod a+r /dev/sda
$ strace -e openat sg_inq /dev/sda
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/dev/sda", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK) = 3
^^^^^^^^
So it would be a regression.
Paolo
