Quoting Serge E. Hallyn ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > Two comments on this patch. > > One issue that is buggine me is when capabilities are not in the > kernel, we get no warning of that. You can do PR_SET_CAPBSET, > and PR_GET_CAPBSET shows the right results after. But you are in > no way constrained by that bset. > > It's not clear how to fix that, because of the weird ways in which > commoncap.c is included in the kernel. There is no config variable > you can rely on to know whether it is included or not. All values > for cap_bset are valid so I can't rely on an invalid value to mean > we're not using it. So the only options that come to mind are to > create a a global variable using_capabilities, and define an > __init function in security/commoncap.c that sets that to one. That, > or really tweak security/Kconfig so we can in fact know when commoncap > will be defined. > > Secondly, after setting the bcap, the current process' > capabilities are not reduced. It takes effect after future > execs. Is that deemed counterintuitive? Or will it be > sufficient to properly document that in the prctl manpage? > > thanks, > -serge
fwiw if anyone was actually thinking about these, I've addressed both in a new patchset. Unfortunately adequate testing will have to wait until next week so I'll send the set out after that. thanks, -serge - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
