Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Crispin Cowan ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > >> I find that ptrace, specifically CAP_SYS_PTRACE, is overloaded. AppArmor >> is having problems because we have to choose between granting >> cap_sys_ptrace, or not allowing the process to read /proc/pid/self & >> such like. So there, the problem is that we have to grant too much power >> to a process to just let it read some /proc stuff about itself. >> >> Here the problem appears to be the other way. cap_sys_ptrace is powerful >> enough to mess with other user's processes on the system, but if ptrace >> gives you hijack, then that seems to give you the power to control >> processes in someone else's namespace. >> > The user namespace patchset I'm working on right now to start having > signals respect user namespaces introduces CAP_NS_OVERRIDE. Once that > is in, then hijack would require CAP_NS_OVERRIDE|CAP_SYS_PTRACE. > > Of course, since we're considering only allowing HIJACK_NS which is > only allowed into a different namespace, hijack would then always > require CAP_NS_OVERRIDE... > > Does that suffice? > I think that CAP_NS_OVERRIDE|CAP_SYS_PTRACE is a problem because of the | making ptrace more powerful than it is now. If you make it CAP_NS_OVERRIDE only, then the problem goes away.
Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin CEO, Mercenary Linux http://mercenarylinux.com/ Itanium. Vista. GPLv3. Complexity at work - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
