--- "Serge E. Hallyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > .... > > Two quick fixes for you right now (apart from the one you've already > got :) would be > > 1. give wireshark cap_kill, by doing something like > > capset cap_kill=ep /bin/wireshark > > 2. compile a kernel with SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n > > Andrew, this pretty much was bound to happen... we need to figure out > what our approach here should be. My preference is still to allow > signals when p->uid==current->uid so long as !SECURE_NOROOT. Then as > people start using secure_noroot process trees they at least must know > what they're asking for. > > An alternative stance is to accept these things as they come up and try > to quickly work with the authors of such programs to work around it. I > suppose in a security sense that's the superior way :) But it also > seems likely to lead to most people choosing option 2 above and not > bothering to fix the problem.
I probably just missed it when it went by, but do you have some test cases for file capabilities lying about that I might use? Thank you. Casey Schaufler [EMAIL PROTECTED] - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
