On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:34:42AM -0600, Jason Gunthorpe wrote: > On Fri, Oct 02, 2015 at 11:38:17AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > Added tpm_trusted_seal() and tpm_trusted_unseal() API for sealing > > trusted keys. > > > > This patch implements basic sealing and unsealing functionality for > > TPM 2.0: > > We really need to stop using chip id's as a handle - the caller should > be using a pointer, it is just a horrible API, and the TPM_ANY_NUM > business is awful too.. TPM's are stateful devices!
Eventually this needs to be refactored out. I don't see it in the scope of these patches or as high priority ATM. > Is it feasible to introduce new APIs with a saner scheme? > > The api layering also seems really weird to me. At a minimum the > tpm_seal_trusted should be called within key_seal, but really, should > key_seal be migrated into the TPM core? I'm not sure it makes alot of > sense to have a tpm_seal_trusted which uses the high level key structs > when other tpm functions are all low level RPC wrappers... I think tpm_seal() inside trusted.c is not a very good API. It takes the ad hoc version of the structs given to key_seal from stack. I don't see a problem here. My viewpoint has been that key_seal/unseal in trusted.c should be refactored out and TPM1 implementations seal/unseal should be moved to the TPM subsystem. There's so little amount of in-kernel low-level TPM code that IMHO it makes sense to keep in one place (as are all the other TPM utility functions). I can work on the TPM1 migration when we have the basic TPM2 stuff in place. > Jason /Jakrkko -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
