Use path_has_perm directly instead.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agrue...@redhat.com>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 18 +++---------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 65e8689..d6b4dc9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1673,18 +1673,6 @@ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
}
-/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
-static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
- struct file *file,
- u32 av)
-{
- struct common_audit_data ad;
-
- ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
- ad.u.path = file->f_path;
- return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
-}
-
/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
@@ -2371,14 +2359,14 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const
struct cred *cred,
struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
/* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
- Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
+ Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly
rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
open file may belong to another process and we are
only interested in the inode-based check here. */
file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
struct tty_file_private, list);
file = file_priv->file;
- if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ |
FILE__WRITE))
+ if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ |
FILE__WRITE))
drop_tty = 1;
}
spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
@@ -3537,7 +3525,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const
struct cred *cred)
* new inode label or new policy.
* This check is not redundant - do not remove.
*/
- return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
+ return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file));
}
/* task security operations */
--
2.5.0
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