Hi,
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhit...@redhat.com>
Steve.
On 29/10/15 00:47, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote:
When gfs2 releases the glock of an inode, it must invalidate all
information cached for that inode, including the page cache and acls. Use
the new security_inode_invalidate_secctx hook to also invalidate security
labels in that case. These items will be reread from disk when needed
after reacquiring the glock.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agrue...@redhat.com>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhit...@redhat.com>
Cc: Bob Peterson <rpete...@redhat.com>
Cc: cluster-de...@redhat.com
---
fs/gfs2/glops.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/gfs2/glops.c b/fs/gfs2/glops.c
index 1f6c9c3..0833076 100644
--- a/fs/gfs2/glops.c
+++ b/fs/gfs2/glops.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/gfs2_ondisk.h>
#include <linux/bio.h>
#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include "gfs2.h"
#include "incore.h"
@@ -262,6 +263,7 @@ static void inode_go_inval(struct gfs2_glock *gl, int flags)
if (ip) {
set_bit(GIF_INVALID, &ip->i_flags);
forget_all_cached_acls(&ip->i_inode);
+ security_inode_invalidate_secctx(&ip->i_inode);
gfs2_dir_hash_inval(ip);
}
}
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