> On 28 Mar 2018, at 01:16, Theodore Y. Ts'o <ty...@mit.edu> wrote: > > On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 04:51:08PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote: >>> /dev/[u]random is not sufficient? >> >> Using /dev/[u]random makes 3 syscalls - open, read, close. This is a >> performance >> issue. > > You may want to take a look at the getrandom(2) system call, which is > the recommended way getting secure random numbers from the kernel. > >>> Well, I am pretty sure userspace can implement proper free ranges >>> tracking… >> >> I think we need to know what libc developers will say on implementing ASLR >> in >> user-mode. I am pretty sure they will say ‘nether’ or ‘some-day’. And >> problem >> of ASLR will stay forever. > > Why can't you send patches to the libc developers? > > Regards, > > - Ted
I still believe the issue is on kernel side, not in library. Best regards, Ilya _______________________________________________ linux-snps-arc mailing list linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-snps-arc