> On 28 Mar 2018, at 01:16, Theodore Y. Ts'o <ty...@mit.edu> wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Mar 27, 2018 at 04:51:08PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote:
>>> /dev/[u]random is not sufficient?
>> 
>> Using /dev/[u]random makes 3 syscalls - open, read, close. This is a 
>> performance
>> issue.
> 
> You may want to take a look at the getrandom(2) system call, which is
> the recommended way getting secure random numbers from the kernel.
> 
>>> Well, I am pretty sure userspace can implement proper free ranges
>>> tracking…
>> 
>> I think we need to know what libc developers will say on implementing ASLR 
>> in 
>> user-mode. I am pretty sure they will say ‘nether’ or ‘some-day’. And 
>> problem 
>> of ASLR will stay forever.
> 
> Why can't you send patches to the libc developers?
> 
> Regards,
> 
>                                               - Ted

I still believe the issue is on kernel side, not in library.

Best regards,
Ilya


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