Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
---
Here's the backport for 3.18.
net/mac80211/wpa.c | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index 983527a4c1ab..49592c7e4199 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <net/mac80211.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include "ieee80211_i.h"
#include "michael.h"
@@ -150,7 +151,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data
*rx)
data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
- if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
+ if (crypto_memneq(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
goto mic_fail;
/* remove Michael MIC from payload */
@@ -520,7 +521,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
queue = rx->security_idx;
- if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
+ if (crypto_memneq(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN)
<= 0) {
key->u.ccmp.replays++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
@@ -771,7 +772,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data
*rx)
bip_aad(skb, aad);
ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
- if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
+ if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
--
2.13.1
