Dan Carpenter <[email protected]> wrote: > This is a static checker fix, not something I have tested. The issue > is that on the second iteration through the loop, we jump forward by > le32_to_cpu(auth_req->length) bytes. The problem is that if the length > is more than "buflen" then we end up with a negative "buflen". A > negative buflen is type promoted to a high positive value and the loop > continues but it's accessing beyond the end of the buffer. > > I believe the "auth_req->length" comes from the firmware and if the > firmware is malicious or buggy, you're already toasted so the impact of > this bug is probably not very severe. > > Fixes: 030645aceb3d ("rndis_wlan: handle 802.11 indications from device") > Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]> > > diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c > b/drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c > index 9935bd09db1f..d4947e3a909e 100644 > --- a/drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c > +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c > @@ -2928,6 +2928,8 @@ static void rndis_wlan_auth_indication(struct usbnet > *usbdev, > > while (buflen >= sizeof(*auth_req)) { > auth_req = (void *)buf; > + if (buflen < le32_to_cpu(auth_req->length)) > + return; > type = "unknown"; > flags = le32_to_cpu(auth_req->flags); > pairwise_error = false;
Patch applied to wireless-drivers-next.git, thanks. ae636fb15548 rndis_wlan: potential buffer overflow in rndis_wlan_auth_indication() -- https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10448061/ https://wireless.wiki.kernel.org/en/developers/documentation/submittingpatches
