If we manage to get our fingers at a RAM dump I doubt we will have to do 
anything further to crack the key.
Disassembling the bootloader should reveal the key/iv pretty fast.
Even if we would be able to guess the first 16 bytes of plaintext, I 
doubt a bruteforce attack would make any sense, 128 bits of key AND iv 
space are simply too much, more than 10^77 possibilities.
Our main hope are the games. Is there really no one with a 3g nano or 
classic out there?

Jeremy Prater schrieb:
> Almost but not quite, a repetitive block of plain-text is encoded with the
> previous cipher-text as the IV (initialization vector) which sets the
> 'state' of the cipher. Then it is encoded with the same key for each block.
> Quote from RFC 3602.. http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3602.html
>
>    The IV is XOR'd with the first plaintext block before it is
>    encrypted.  Then for successive blocks, the previous ciphertext block
>    is XOR'd with the current plaintext, before it is encrypted.
>
> About memory dumps, only the first block (16-bytes) is required to recover
> the key. Some aes implementations have the key and the iv. Some references
> always set iv as 0x0000000000000000 but it has the ability to be set as any
> 128-bit value. Even if we did have the plain-text we would need the key and
> the iv (if its used).
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: MsTiFtS [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> Sent: Wednesday, October 03, 2007 8:05 AM
> To: Hardware and developpement mailing list.
> Subject: Re: [Linux4nano-dev] Concerning a block cipher.
>
> Jeremy Prater schrieb:
>   
>> The 240byte position split in the various versions in the aupd verify 
>> the block size is 16byte (128-bit). It is odd that the aupd and osos 
>> filesizes are multiples of 2048 also, I thought it could be just a 
>> coincidence in osos, but both files is odd. To use decrypting 
>> functions in winhex goto edit | convert (ctrl + r) and it brings a box 
>> up, also hackman hexeditor can do decryption. I use them both for 
>> testing stuff. I don't really know where to go from here, aes-cbc is 
>> difficult to get the plain-text from the cipher-text, I was looking at 
>> 1g nano firmware to see about strings and stuff, but I doubt any of 
>> that data made it into the 2g firmware. Later -- Jeremy
>>
>>     
> I guess these files are just padded to fill the 2K blocksize of the flash.
> Well, there are definitely a lot of strings and stuff we know must be in 
> there, but we don't know where they are. I would have also guessed that 
> there would be at least some zero padding, but I couldn't find any 
> repetitive ciphertext blocks, no matter how hard I search. If I 
> understood the workings of a CBC cipher correctly, repetitive blocks of 
> plaintext must yield repetitive blocks of ciphertext, right?
> What ways are there to crack the key if you know plaintext AND 
> ciphertext? Does that need a brute force attack?
>
> Thanks for your good and hard work ;)
>   
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
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>> http://www.linux4nano.org
>>     
>
>
>
>
>
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