On 23 Oct 2012, at 23:29, "Joel M. Halpern" <[email protected]> wrote:
> If I understood, you expressed disagreement with the general description of > LISP security. > Can you suggest what approach you would like to see taken? > Section 7.4 is perfectly fine in the document, it is simply that I think the security in LISP is not "just enough" but "almost just enough". Saying just enough gives me the impression that the question is done, solved. But I think we have not explored yet all what we could have in term of security for LISP. For example, we have never really looked at cryptography, puzzling, third party verification... I remember the draft-saucez-lisp-mapping-security that did not get that much attention, fortunately, LISP-SEC came and solved partially the problem with a very pragmatic approach. My academic blood tells me that we should look at everything and try to find magical solutions to protect everything. On the other hand, the operations show that in security the best is really the enemy of the good. So we have to find a trade-off between best and good. Damien Saucez > Thank you, > Joel _______________________________________________ lisp mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lisp
