From: Damien Saucez [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, May 23, 2014 9:07 AM To: Ronald Bonica Cc: Dino Farinacci; Roger Jorgensen; LISP mailing list list Subject: Re: [lisp] Restarting last call on LISP threats
Hello Ronald, On 22 May 2014, at 22:57, Ronald Bonica <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Dino, Today's Internet is not as fragile as you think. This mail traversed many routers between my house and yours. If those routers are well-managed, there is nothing that I can do from my house that will cause any of those routers to consume control plane resources. Therefore, there is nothing that I can do from my house that will cause a DoS attack against those routers' control planes. We tend to disagree with that, for example you have ICMP today... [RPB] Because ICMP is susceptible to DoS attacks, it wouldn't make a very good routing protocol. That's why we don't use it for routing. By contrast, LISP map-request messages are susceptible to DoS attacks and they do carry routing information. In LISP, separation between the forwarding and control plane is lost. As a matter of course, forwarding plane activity causes control plane activity. Since forwarding plane bandwidth exceeds control plane bandwidth, DoS attacks against the control plane are possible. In order to be complete, the threats document must describe the DoS threat. It should also describe mitigations, if any exist. DoS is already explained and the definition given: " A Denial of Service (DoS) attack aims at disrupting a specific targeted service either by exhausting the resources of the victim up to the point that it is not able to provide a reliable service to legit traffic and/or systems or by exploiting vulnerabilities to make the targeted service unable to operate properly. " is covering the case you mention. [RPB] You might want to add the following details to section 5.2: - A DoS attack can be launched by anybody who can send a packet to the XTR's LOC - DoS attacks can render an XTR inoperable - DDoS attacks can render the mapping system inoperable. This is what differentiates LISP from today's routing system. Ron Damien Saucez Ron -----Original Message----- From: Dino Farinacci [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Wednesday, May 21, 2014 6:58 PM To: Ronald Bonica Cc: Roger Jorgensen; [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Subject: Re: [lisp] Restarting last call on LISP threats The attacker sends a flow of crafted packets to the victim XTR. Each packet is a well-formed LISP data packet. It contains: - an outer IP header (LOC->LOC) - a UDP header - a LISP Header - an IP header (EID->EID) - payload Just like a regular packet I can send to your home router today. So yes okay. So let's continue. See comments below. Each packet contains control plane information that is new to the victim Be more specific about what control information are in these encapsulated packets. XTR. For example, the victim XTR has no mapping information regarding either the source LOC or source EID prefix. Rather than gleaning this mapping information from the crafted packet, the victim XTR sends a verifying MAP- REQUEST to the mapping system. Assume that the attack flow is large (N packets per second). Assume also that the XTRs rate limit for MAP-REQUEST messages is less than N packets per second. Has the attack not effectively DoS'd the victim XTR? It caches the rate the rate the packets are coming in and eventually stops sending Map-Requests completely. It cannot stop the incoming rate of packets today just like a roque BGP attacker can send millions of packets per second to a peer regardless if it does or does not have the peer authentication key. To make this attack work, every packet in the attack flow may need to have a unique, spoofed, source LOC. An implementation can detect that after rate limiting 1000s of such requests are happening that it just stops operation. What if I sent a Juniper 20 million routes today? The Internet is very fragile and LISP IS NOT making it worse. And in some cases it is making it better with integrated techniques. Dino _______________________________________________ lisp mailing list [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lisp
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