A general reply, we were on the way to getting into a head-to-head discussion instead of being constructive. The last few email I read moved away from that path.
I think we should discuss all threat, not just define them to be out of scope. some comments: On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 4:36 PM, Ross Callon <[email protected]> wrote: > Detailed comments below. To summarize, these details include three threats > which are new to LISP and which are not adequately explained in the current > threats document: > > (1) The Control Plane Threat: LISP allows a dataplane DOS attack (lots of > packets sent to overwhelm a site) to turn into a control plane attack (the > router is forced to respond to the attack in the control plane, which is of > course frequently multiple orders of magnitude slower than the data plane, > particularly for very high speed routers). Seems like we all disagree on how serious this is, how much harm it can do. But it should be mention. I think I remember an earlier discussion on a very similar topic that just ended with people disagreeing and stopped discussing it. This is probably a new topic, but where is the weakness really, Mapping-System or on the xTR side? ...? Could be that our ongoing discussion here might be because it's not good enough explained? > (2) The Privacy Threat: LISP provides an attacker with a relatively easy way > to determine the identity of large numbers of PE and/or CE routers (globally, > if LISP is deployed on that level) . I agree there are privacy threats. LISP is no better or worse compared to current internet on privacy for end-user, it's reveled one way or another somehow unless you encrypt your data (HTTPs etc). What LISP add to the pool is the possibility to collect the IP for many end-sites with ease, xTR sides. Is that the same thing as what you're describing? > (3) the Traffic Gleaning Threat: If an xTR gleans EID -> RLOC mappings from > incoming packets, this provides an easy way for hackers to intercept traffic. > I put this threat third because gleaning can be turned off, and thus this > threat can be defeated simply by not gleaning EID -> RLOC mappings. Isn't this the same as on-path and Man-in-the-middle attack? Or do you describe something else? -- Roger Jorgensen | ROJO9-RIPE [email protected] | - IPv6 is The Key! http://www.jorgensen.no | [email protected] _______________________________________________ lisp mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lisp
