I am not sure what would go in the introduction document that would
address Radia's concern.
Each mapping system document includes security considerations that are
specific to that mapping system. The Original BGP based system has one
set of properties, the DDT one (which we will be advancing after the
blocking documents are cleared) as a different set. The introduction
document is not a requirements document driving that work, but rather an
explanation.
I suppose we could add a short paragraph that notes that individual
mapping systems need to address traffic misdirection threats, and that
the mapping system interfaces (Map Servers and Map Resolvers, and the
protocol between ITRs/ETRs and those components) need to address a
multitude of security issues. But would that kind of text really help
the introduction?
I very much don't want to see this document getting into the question of
why not to use DNS as the mapping system, or a DNS clone, or ... One of
the keys to the LISP design is that different mapping system designs can
be and are being tried. One of the challenges in writing this
introduction is to reflect the existing RFCs while allowing for the new
work such as DDT that we know the working group plans so as not to
obsolete this introduction.
Yours,
Joel
On 3/4/15 9:11 PM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-lisp-introduction-12: Discuss
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DISCUSS:
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It appears the SecDir review didn't make it to LISP list for some reason.
There is one important security request from Radia's review and many
other good suggestions.
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg05415.html
Expanding the Security Considerations section would be helpful, here is
the background on the request:
There is a security considerations section, which focuses on a class of
denial of service attacks. There are presumably security considerations
sections in the other documents, including one that focuses entirely on
security, so it is not necessary that all security issues be brought up
here. That said, I think that if you were to write an "introduction to
security considerations", there are more important ones than the DoS
threat.
in particular, as a routing protocol care must be taken to make sure a
bad
actor cannot attract someone else's traffic with mechanisms like those
we
are trying to address with BGP security. Much of the routing information
is
maintained in a database "like DNS". If it *were* DNS, DNSSEC could be
used
to address the integrity issues. If it is home grown, some equivalent
mechanism will be necessary. Why not use DNS?
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COMMENT:
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Please do look at the other suggestions from the review as they should
help clarify a few points in the draft and provide the background needed
for an introduction draft.
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg05415.html
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