Hi Dino, The pre-shared key I mentioned about would need to be pre-configured on the peers/xTRs. DH shared secret is based on DH public values exchanged on the wire which QC can break.
Thanks, -Amjad -----Original Message----- From: Dino Farinacci [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 06 November 2015 PM 12:15 To: Amjad Inamdar (amjads) Cc: [email protected] Subject: Re: [lisp] LISP crypto In the lisp-crypto design, the ECDH shared secret is input to the KDF that produces the encryption key and integrity-check key. Sounds like we may already be doing what you suggest. And not clear to me how much more QC-safe this actually is. Dino > On Nov 6, 2015, at 1:47 PM, Amjad Inamdar (amjads) <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi Dino, > > The thing being proposed with IKEv2 is to include a pre-shared key in the key > derivation and with sufficient entropy in the pre-shared key, this would > offer fair amount of protection. You can please refer draft-fluhrer-qr-ikev2 > for further details. > > Thanks, > -Amjad > > -----Original Message----- > From: Dino Farinacci [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: 06 November 2015 AM 05:34 > To: Amjad Inamdar (amjads) > Cc: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [lisp] LISP crypto > > Amjad, we are aware of the QC-safe work going on in CFRG. We are following it > but it is very researchy at this point. We can add some text indicating that > we’ll follow any CFRG/SAAG recommendations (or any security area working > group’s recommendation) on using QC-safe technology. > > If there is anything specific you want us to look at with IKE, please send > some pointers. Thanks. > > Dino > >> On Nov 5, 2015, at 10:37 AM, Amjad Inamdar (amjads) <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Hi Brian/Dino, >> >> The key material derivation proposed in draft-ietf-lisp-crypto is based on >> Diffie-Hellman which is not Quantum Computer resistant. There is some work >> underway to make IKE that uses DH for key derivation Quantum Computer safe. >> Might be a good idea to consider this for lisp-crypto as well. >> >> Thanks, >> -Amjad >> >> From: Amjad Inamdar (amjads) >> Sent: 03 November 2015 PM 12:33 >> To: '[email protected]' >> Subject: LISP NAT Traversal >> >> Hi, >> >> It will be useful if LISP NAT traversal draft >> (draft-ermagan-lisp-nat-traversal) can elaborate on the following >> >> 1) Why LISP NAT traversal cannot be accomplished without RTR (another >> network entity) which has implications on deployability, complexity and >> latency. There are other protocols (e.g IKE/IPsec) that achieve NAT-D and >> NAT-T without the need for additional network entity. >> >> 2) Some more details on RTR deployment >> - location of RTR in the LISP deployment like there are >> recommendations on PITR/PETR deployments >> - is RTR shared across LISP sites behind NAT or each site needs a >> dedicated RTR >> - what if RTR is behind another NAT (SP-NAT) >> >> 3) How is multiple-NAT handled (e.g. enterprise and SP NAT) >> >> Thanks, >> -Amjad Inamdar CISSP, CCNP R&S, CCNP Security, CCDP, CCSK Senior >> Technical Leader CSG PI Services Security - India >> >> _______________________________________________ >> lisp mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lisp > _______________________________________________ lisp mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lisp
