Ciao Luigi,
below I have replied to each comment. I'm working to the updated text,
that I will send as soon as it is ready. ideally we might be able to
publish a new version before draft deadline.
Just a note on the most recurring comment: SHOULD vs. MUST.
The use of SHOULD across the document is according to RFC 2119:
SHOULD
This word, or the adjective "RECOMMENDED", mean that there
may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore a
particular item, but the full implications must be understood and
carefully weighed before choosing a different course.
There are use cases where, carefully weighing the implications, some of
the security services of LISP-SEC can be turned-off. We want to leave
implementors the freedom to allow this flexibility.
For example, in a DC deployment it may make sense to turn off OTK
decryption between XTR and MS/MR, as MiTM is very unlikely.
Similarly, an ITR may decide to implement a loose policy on accepting an
AD authenticated with an algorithm different from the preferred
authentication algorithm expressed by the ITR. Using a MUST would force
support of a given authentication algorithm across each and every MS and
ETR, that might not be the case when incrementally deploying LISP-SEC
(or while upgrading routers).
Using a MUST would prevent this flexibility, that we would like to leave
to the implementors.
On 10/19/16 8:06 AM, Luigi Iannone wrote:
Dear Authors of the LISP-SEC document,
hereafter my review of the document.
This was long overdue, sorry for being so late.
I really like the solution and the majority of my comments are just
clarification questions.
Let me know if my comments are clear.
ciao
L.
1. Introduction
The Locator/ID Separation Protocol [RFC6830] defines a set of
functions for routers to exchange information used to map from non-
routable Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) to routable Routing Locators
(RLOCs).
I find the above sentence confusing. Wouldn’t be better to specify
that we are talking about IP addresses?
That's how LISP is described in RFC6830, section 1. If you start using
the term IP address then you need to qualify if you are talking about
Identity-IP or Locator-IP, so the sentence gets complicated pretty quickly.
I would leave this one unchanged.
If these EID-to-RLOC mappings, carried through Map-Reply
messages, are transmitted without integrity protection, an adversary
can manipulate them and hijack the communication, impersonate the
requested EID, or mount Denial of Service or Distributed Denial of
Service attacks. Also, if the Map-Reply message is transported
unauthenticated, an adversarial LISP entity can overclaim an EID-
prefix and maliciously redirect traffic directed to a large number of
hosts. A detailed description of "overclaiming" attack is provided
in [RFC7835].
This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that
provides origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection
to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup
process.
I would put s forward reference to section 3 stating that the reader
will find details about the threat model.
OK. We can replace the sentence
A detailed description of "overclaiming" attack is provided
in [RFC7835]
with
The LISP-SEC threat model, described in Section 3, is built on top of the LISP threat
model defined in RFC7835, that includes a detailed description of
"overclaiming" attack.
LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID-
prefix claims in Map-Reply messages, ensuring that the sender of a
Map-Reply that provides the location for a given EID-prefix is
entitled to do so according to the EID prefix registered in the
associated Map-Server. Map-Register security, including the right
for a LISP entity to register an EID-prefix or to claim presence at
an RLOC, is out of the scope of LISP-SEC. Additional security
considerations are described in Section 6.
2. Definition of Terms
One-Time Key (OTK): An ephemeral randomly generated key that must
be used for a single Map-Request/Map-Reply exchange.
ITR-OTK: The One-Time Key generated at the ITR.
MS-OTK: The One-Time Key generated at the Map-Server.
Why are you considering ITR-OTK and MS-OTK sub-terms?
I would elevate them at full terms, hence avoiding spacing and
indentation.
Ok.
Encapsulated Control Message (ECM): A LISP control message that is
prepended with an additional LISP header. ECM is used by ITRs to
send LISP control messages to a Map-Resolver, by Map-Resolvers to
forward LISP control messages to a Map-Server, and by Map-
Resolvers to forward LISP control messages to an ETR.
Why are you re-defining ECM?
You do not specify other packets, e.g., Map-Reply, so why ECM?
I would drop it.
It is not defined in the Definitions section of 6830. One would need to
go through the body of 6830 to find it.
I'll drop it, but we need to make sure that ECM gets into the definition
section of 6830bis.
Albert: are you looking into that document? Can you take care of this?
Authentication Data (AD): Metadata that is included either in a
LISP ECM header or in a Map-Reply message to support
confidentiality, integrity protection, and verification of EID-
prefix authorization.
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OTK-AD: The portion of ECM Authentication Data that contains a
One-Time Key.
EID-AD: The portion of ECM and Map-Reply Authentication Data
used for verification of EID-prefix authorization.
PKT-AD: The portion of Map-Reply Authentication Data used to
protect the integrity of the Map-Reply message.
Why are you considering OTK-AD, EID-AD, and PKT-AD sub-terms?
I would elevate them at full terms, hence avoiding spacing and
indentation.
ok.
For definitions of other terms, notably Map-Request, Map-Reply,
Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR), Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), Map-Server
(MS), and Map-Resolver (MR) please consult the LISP specification
[RFC6830].
3. LISP-SEC Threat Model
LISP-SEC addresses the control plane threats, described in [RFC7835],
that target EID-to-RLOC mappings, including manipulations of Map-
Request and Map-Reply messages, and malicious ETR EID prefix
overclaiming. LISP-SEC makes two main assumptions: (1) the LISP
mapping system is expected to deliver a Map-Request message to their
intended destination ETR as identified by the EID, and (2) no man-in-
the-middle (MITM) attack can be mounted within the LISP Mapping
System. Furthermore, while LISP-SEC enables detection of EID prefix
overclaiming attacks, it assumes that Map-Servers can verify the EID
prefix authorization at time of registration.
LISP-SEC does not require OTK confidentiality in the mapping system.
This should be discussed here.
we could add to the above
"and (2) no man-in-
the-middle (MITM) attack can be mounted within the LISP Mapping
System."
How the Mapping System is protected from MiTM attacks depends from the
particular Mapping System used, and is out of the scope of this memo.
According to the threat model described in [RFC7835] LISP-SEC assumes
that any kind of attack, including MITM attacks, can be mounted in
the access network, outside of the boundaries of the LISP mapping
system. An on-path attacker, outside of the LISP mapping system can,
for example, hijack Map-Request and Map-Reply messages, spoofing the
identity of a LISP node. Another example of on-path attack, called
overclaiming attack, can be mounted by a malicious Egress Tunnel
Router (ETR), by overclaiming the EID-prefixes for which it is
authoritative. In this way the ETR can maliciously redirect traffic
directed to a large number of hosts.
4. Protocol Operations
The goal of the security mechanisms defined in [RFC6830] is to
prevent unauthorized insertion of mapping data by providing origin
authentication and integrity protection for the Map-Registration, and
by using the nonce to detect unsolicited Map-Reply sent by off-path
attackers.
LISP-SEC builds on top of the security mechanisms defined in
[RFC6830] to address the threats described in Section 3 by leveraging
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the trust relationships existing among the LISP entities
participating to the exchange of the Map-Request/Map-Reply messages.
Those trust relationships are used to securely distribute a One-Time
Key (OTK) that provides origin authentication, integrity and anti-
replay protection to mapping data conveyed via the mapping lookup
process, and that effectively prevent overclaiming attacks. The
processing of security parameters during the Map-Request/Map-Reply
exchange is as follows:
o The ITR-OTK is generated and stored at the ITR, and securely
transported to the Map-Server.
o The Map-Server uses the ITR-OTK to compute an HMAC that protects
You did not define HMAC acronym. Please define and add a reference.
ok.
the integrity of the mapping data known to the Map-Server to
prevent overclaiming attacks. The Map-Server also derives a new
OTK, the MS-OTK, that is passed to the ETR, by applying a Key
Derivation Function (KDF) to the ITR-OTK.
o The ETR uses the MS-OTK to compute an HMAC that protects the
integrity of the Map-Reply sent to the ITR.
o Finally, the ITR uses the stored ITR-OTK to verify the integrity
of the mapping data provided by both the Map-Server and the ETR,
and to verify that no overclaiming attacks were mounted along the
path between the Map-Server and the ITR.
Section 5 provides the detailed description of the LISP-SEC control
messages and their processing, while the rest of this section
describes the flow of protocol operations at each entity involved in
the Map-Request/Map-Reply exchange:
o The ITR, upon needing to transmit a Map-Request message, generates
and stores an OTK (ITR-OTK). This ITR-OTK is included into the
Encapsulated Control Message (ECM) that contains the Map-Request
sent to the Map-Resolver. To provide confidentiality to the ITR-
OTK over the path between the ITR and its Map-Resolver, the ITR-
OTK SHOULD
Why not using “MUST”???
Are you suggesting that a different way to provide confidentiality can
be used (e.g. a different shared key)???
If yes, please state so.
Or are you suggesting that no encryption at all is used? But this
means not providing confidentiality…
Can you clarify?
(this very same comment will appear several time in this review)
We don't want to make the use of pre-shared key *mandatory* to all LISP
deployments. There are deployments where the risk of MiTM between the
xTR and the MS/MR may not justify the cost of provisioning a shared key
(data centers, for example).
be encrypted using a preconfigured key shared between
the ITR and the Map-Resolver, similar to the key shared between
the ETR and the Map-Server in order to secure ETR registration
[RFC6833].
o The Map-Resolver decapsulates the ECM message, decrypts the ITR-
OTK, if needed, and forwards through the Mapping System the
received Map-Request and the ITR-OTK, as part of a new ECM
message. As described in Section 5.6, the LISP Mapping System
delivers the ECM to the appropriate Map-Server, as identified by
the EID destination address of the Map-Request.
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o The Map-Server is configured with the location mappings and policy
information for the ETR responsible for the EID destination
address. Using this preconfigured information, the Map-Server,
after the decapsulation of the ECM message, finds the longest
match EID-prefix that covers the requested EID in the received
Map-Request. The Map-Server adds this EID-prefix, together with
an HMAC computed using the ITR-OTK, to a new Encapsulated Control
Message that contains the received Map-Request.
o The Map-Server derives a new OTK, the MS-OTK, by applying a Key
Derivation Function (KDF) to the ITR-OTK. This MS-OTK is included
in the Encapsulated Control Message that the Map-Server uses to
forward the Map-Request to the ETR. To provide MS-OTK
confidentiality over the path between the Map-Server and the ETR,
the MS-OTK should
This “should” should be a “SHOULD” (sorry for the cacophony…)
Ok.
Why not using “MUST”???
Are you suggesting that a different way to provide confidentiality can
be used (e.g. a different shared key)???
If yes, please state so.
Or are you suggesting that no encryption at all is used? But this
means not providing confidentiality…
Can you clarify?
Same as above.
be encrypted using the key shared between the
ETR and the Map-Server in order to secure ETR registration
[RFC6833].
o If the Map-Server is acting in proxy mode, as specified in
[RFC6830], the ETR is not involved in the generation of the Map-
Reply. In this case the Map-Server generates the Map-Reply on
behalf of the ETR as described below.
o The ETR, upon receiving the ECM encapsulated Map-Request from the
Map-Server, decrypts the MS-OTK, if needed, and originates a
standard Map-Reply that contains the EID-to-RLOC mapping
information as specified in [RFC6830].
o The ETR computes an HMAC over this standard Map-Reply, keyed with
MS-OTK to protect the integrity of the whole Map-Reply. The ETR
also copies the EID-prefix authorization data that the Map-Server
included in the ECM encapsulated Map-Request into the Map-Reply
message. The ETR then sends this complete Map-Reply message to
the requesting ITR.
o The ITR, upon receiving the Map-Reply, uses the locally stored
ITR-OTK to verify the integrity of the EID-prefix authorization
data included in the Map-Reply by the Map-Server. The ITR
computes the MS-OTK by applying the same KDF used by the Map-
Server, and verifies the integrity of the Map-Reply. If the
integrity checks fail, the Map-Reply MUST be discarded. Also, if
the EID-prefixes claimed by the ETR in the Map-Reply are not equal
or more specific than the EID-prefix authorization data inserted
by the Map-Server, the ITR MUST discard the Map-Reply.
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5. LISP-SEC Control Messages Details
LISP-SEC metadata associated with a Map-Request is transported within
the Encapsulated Control Message that contains the Map-Request.
LISP-SEC metadata associated with the Map-Reply is transported within
the Map-Reply itself.
5.1. Encapsulated Control Message LISP-SEC Extensions
LISP-SEC uses the ECM (Encapsulated Control Message) defined in
[RFC6830] with Type set to 8, and S bit set to 1 to indicate that the
LISP header includes Authentication Data (AD). The format of the
LISP-SEC ECM Authentication Data is defined in the following figure.
OTK-AD stands for One-Time Key Authentication Data and EID-AD stands
for EID Authentication Data.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AD Type |V| Reserved | Requested HMAC ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\
| OTK Length | OTK Encryption ID | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| One-Time-Key Preamble ... | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ OTK-AD
| ... One-Time-Key Preamble | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
~ One-Time Key (128 bits) ~/
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <---+
| EID-AD Length | KDF ID | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Record Count | Reserved | EID HMAC ID | EID-AD
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\ |
| Reserved | EID mask-len | EID-AFI | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Rec |
~ EID-prefix ... ~ | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+/ |
~ EID HMAC ~ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <—+
I think that “rec” is mis-aligned and should be shifted one character
upward.
No. The row above is the portion of the header that specifies how many
records will follow. Rec shows one Rec item, in the array of Records.
It is consistent with 6830.
LISP-SEC ECM Authentication Data
AD Type: 1 (LISP-SEC Authentication Data)
This is the first document starting to allocate values to the "AD
Type” value.
Why not asking IANA to create a registry??
(to be done in the IANA Considerations Section)
Ok.
V: Key Version bit. This bit is toggled when the sender switches
to a new OTK wrapping key
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Reserved: Set to 0 on transmission and ignored on receipt.
Requested HMAC ID: The HMAC algorithm requested by the ITR. See
Section 5.4 for details.
OTK Length: The length (in bytes) of the OTK Authentication Data
(OTK-AD), that contains the OTK Preamble and the OTK.
OTK Encryption ID: The identifier of the key wrapping algorithm
used to encrypt the One-Time-Key. When a 128-bit OTK is sent
unencrypted by the Map-Resolver, the OTK Encryption ID is set to
NULL_KEY_WRAP_128. See Section 5.5 for more details.
One-Time-Key Preamble: set to 0 if the OTK is not encrypted. When
the OTK is encrypted, this field may carry additional metadata
resulting from the key wrapping operation. When a 128-bit OTK is
sent unencrypted by Map-Resolver, the OTK Preamble is set to
0x0000000000000000 (64 bits). See Section 5.5 for details.
One-Time-Key: the OTK encrypted (or not) as specified by OTK
Encryption ID. See Section 5.5 for details.
EID-AD Length: length (in bytes) of the EID Authentication Data
(EID-AD). The ITR MUST set EID-AD Length to 4 bytes, as it only
fills the KDF ID field, and all the remaining fields part of the
EID-AD are not present. An EID-AD MAY contain multiple EID-
records. Each EID-record is 4-byte long plus the length of the
AFI-encoded EID-prefix.
KDF ID: Identifier of the Key Derivation Function used to derive
the MS-OTK. The ITR SHOULD use this field to indicate the
recommended KDF algorithm, according to local policy.
I am not sure I understand the rationale of this “SHOULD”. If for any
reason the ITR does not indicate the KDF ID what are the consequences?
That should be a MAY, I believe,
The ITR can specify "no preference" for KDF ID, using a value of 0.
In the ITR processing section 5.4, we should add to
The KDF ID field, specifies the suggested key derivation function to
be used by the Map-Server to derive the MS-OTK.
a text like: "A KDF ID value of 0 (NONE), MAY be used to specify that
the ITR has no preferred KDF ID".
Is the MS free to choose the algorithm? This should be clarified.
This is specified in section 5.7.
"
The Map-Server updates the OTK-AD by deriving a new OTK (MS-OTK) from
the ITR-OTK received with the Map-Request. MS-OTK is derived
applying the key derivation function specified in the KDF ID field.
If the algorithm specified in the KDF ID field is not supported, the
Map-Server uses a different algorithm to derive the key and updates
the KDF ID field accordingly.
"
The Map-
Server can overwrite the KDF ID if it does not support the KDF ID
recommended by the ITR.
What happens if the MS will choose a KDF ID not supported by the ITR?
Can you clarify how to solve this situation or explain why this will
never happen?
This is specified in 5.4, ITR processing.
"
To verify the integrity of the PKT-AD, first the MS-OTK is derived
from the locally stored ITR-OTK using the algorithm specified in the
KDF ID field. This is because the PKT-AD is generated by the ETR
using the MS-OTK. If the KDF ID in the Map-Reply does not match the
KDF ID requested in the Map-Request, the ITR SHOULD discard the Map-
Reply and send, at the first opportunity it needs to, a new Map-
Request with a different KDF ID, according to ITR's local policy.
"
There are two typical use cases:
- strict KDF ID policy: ITR specifiy a KDF ID, and will discard
map-reply with different KDF IDs. If local policy allows, another
map-request will be sent with a different KDF ID
- loose KDF ID policy: ITR specify KDF ID = none, and will accept
map-reply with any KDF ID (if supported by ITR). If received KDF is not
supported the ITR shall drop the map-reply
See Section 5.4 for more details.
Record Count: The number of records in this Map-Request message.
A record is comprised of the portion of the packet that is labeled
'Rec' above and occurs the number of times equal to Record Count.
Reserved: Set to 0 on transmission and ignored on receipt.
EID HMAC ID: Identifier of the HMAC algorithm used to protect the
integrity of the EID-AD. This field is filled by Map-Server that
computed the EID-prefix HMAC. See Section 5.4 for more details.
EID mask-len: Mask length for EID-prefix.
EID-AFI: Address family of EID-prefix according to [RFC5226]
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EID-prefix: The Map-Server uses this field to specify the EID-
prefix that the destination ETR is authoritative for, and is the
longest match for the requested EID.
EID HMAC: HMAC of the EID-AD computed and inserted by Map-Server.
Before computing the HMAC operation the EID HMAC field MUST be set
to 0. The HMAC covers the entire EID-AD.
5.2. Map-Reply LISP-SEC Extensions
LISP-SEC uses the Map-Reply defined in [RFC6830], with Type set to 2,
and S bit set to 1 to indicate that the Map-Reply message includes
Authentication Data (AD). The format of the LISP-SEC Map-Reply
Authentication Data is defined in the following figure. PKT-AD is
the Packet Authentication Data that covers the Map-Reply payload.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AD Type | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <---+
| EID-AD Length | KDF ID | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Record Count | Reserved | EID HMAC ID | EID-AD
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\ |
| Reserved | EID mask-len | EID-AFI | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Rec |
~ EID-prefix ... ~ | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+/ |
~ EID HMAC ~ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <---+
| PKT-AD Length | PKT HMAC ID |\
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
~ PKT HMAC ~ PKT-AD
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+/
LISP-SEC Map-Reply Authentication Data
AD Type: 1 (LISP-SEC Authentication Data)
Shouldn’t this be a different value? This AD format is different from
the one described in section 5.1!
Another reason to ask IANA for a registry….
One is the LISP-SEC authentication data that applies to the ECM message
(when S-bit = 1), the other is the LISP-SEC authentication data that
applies to the Map-Reply (when S-bit = 1).
Those are extensions of two different messages (ECM and map-reply), and
they are both identified by an AD Type (that happens to be set to value
1 for both).
Yes, the AD type space is different so we will need two IANA registries.
Question for the co-auhtors: should we change the name to 'ECM AD Type'
and 'Map-Reply AD Type'?
EID-AD Length: length (in bytes) of the EID-AD. An EID-AD MAY
contain multiple EID-records. Each EID-record is 4-byte long plus
the length of the AFI-encoded EID-prefix.
KDF ID: Identifier of the Key Derivation Function used to derive
MS-OTK. See Section 5.7 for more details.
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Record Count: The number of records in this Map-Reply message. A
record is comprised of the portion of the packet that is labeled
'Rec' above and occurs the number of times equal to Record Count.
Reserved: Set to 0 on transmission and ignored on receipt.
EID HMAC ID: Identifier of the HMAC algorithm used to protect the
integrity of the EID-AD. See Section 5.7 for more details.
EID mask-len: Mask length for EID-prefix.
EID-AFI: Address family of EID-prefix according to [RFC5226].
EID-prefix: This field contains an EID-prefix that the destination
ETR is authoritative for, and is the longest match for the
requested EID.
EID HMAC: HMAC of the EID-AD, as computed by the Map-Server.
Before computing the HMAC operation the EID HMAC field MUST be set
to 0. The HMAC covers the entire EID-AD.
PKT-AD Length: length (in bytes) of the Packet Authentication Data
(PKT-AD).
PKT HMAC ID: Identifier of the HMAC algorithm used to protect the
integrity of the Map-reply Location Data.
“Location Data” is something nowhere defined. Can you clarify what do
you mean?
we can just remove 'Location Data'
PKT HMAC: HMAC of the whole Map-Reply packet, including the LISP-
SEC Authentication Data. The scope of the authentication goes
from the Map-Reply Type field to the PKT HMAC field included.
Before computing the HMAC operation the PKT HMAC field MUST be set
to 0. See Section 5.8 for more details.
5.3. Map-Register LISP-SEC Extentions
The second bit after the Type field in a Map-Register message is
allocated as the S bit.
I would better explain that this document is allocating a bit marked
as reserved in 6830.
Ok. We will need to reflect this in 6830bis as well.
Furthermore, at the cost of being redundant, I would put the packet
format highlighting the position of the bit so that there is no
confusion whatsoever.
We wanted to explicitly avoid to include the format of messages when
already defined in other documents, so we point rather than copy. If we
address this in 6830bis, the problem will be solved.
The S bit indicates to the Map-Server that
the registering ETR is LISP-SEC enabled. An ETR that supports LISP-
SEC MUST set the S bit in its Map-Register messages.
5.4. ITR Processing
Upon creating a Map-Request, the ITR generates a random ITR-OTK that
is stored locally, together with the nonce generated as specified in
[RFC6830].
The Map-Request MUST be encapsulated in an ECM, with the S-bit set to
1, to indicate the presence of Authentication Data. If the ITR and
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the Map-Resolver are configured with a shared key,
In section 4 you seem to suggest that this is not the only way to
protect the OTK (see my comment).
Here instead you suggest that a shared key is the only way.
Right. Here it says what to do IF there is a shared key, that is
consistent with the SHOULD above.
the ITR-OTK
confidentiality SHOULD be protected by wrapping the ITR-OTK with the
algorithm specified by the OTK Encryption ID field.
Not clear what this “SHOULD” refers to.
IS the SHOULD related to the fact to encrypt the OTK? The ITR SHOULD
encrypt.
Or the choice of the algorithm? The ITR SHOULD use the algorithm
specified by the OTK Encryption ID?
The second case looks impossible since is the ITR is choosing the
algorithm. May be the sentence can be rewritten.
SHOULD refers to protecting the confidentiality of the ITR-OTK. Maybe
the 'by' should be replaced by 'with'?
Similarly to previous comment: Why it is not a MUST?
Same as other SHOULD.
See Section 5.5
for further details on OTK encryption.
The Requested HMAC ID field contains the suggested HMAC algorithm to
be used by the Map-Server and the ETR to protect the integrity of the
ECM Authentication data and of the Map-Reply.
What happens if the MS will choose a HMAC not supported by the ETR or
the ITR?
Can you clarify how to solve this situation or explain why this will
never happen?
This is described 5 paragraphs below:
"
If the EID HMAC ID field does
not match the Requested HMAC ID the ITR SHOULD discard the Map-Reply
and send, at the first opportunity it needs to, a new Map-Request
with a different Requested HMAC ID field, according to ITR's local
policy.
"
The KDF ID field, specifies the suggested key derivation function to
be used by the Map-Server to derive the MS-OTK.
What happens if the MS will choose a KDF ID not supported by the ITR?
Can you clarify how to solve this situation or explain why this will
never happen?
This is described a few paragraphs below:
"
If the KDF ID in the Map-Reply does not match the
KDF ID requested in the Map-Request, the ITR SHOULD discard the Map-
Reply and send, at the first opportunity it needs to, a new Map-
Request with a different KDF ID, according to ITR's...
"
The EID-AD length is set to 4 bytes, since the Authentication Data
does not contain EID-prefix Authentication Data, and the EID-AD
contains only the KDF ID field.
In response to an encapsulated Map-Request that has the S-bit set, an
ITR MUST receive a Map-Reply with the S-bit set, that includes an
EID-AD and a PKT-AD. If the Map-Reply does not include both ADs, the
ITR MUST discard it. In response to an encapsulated Map-Request with
S-bit set to 0, the ITR expects a Map-Reply with S-bit set to 0, and
the ITR SHOULD discard the Map-Reply if the S-bit is set.
Why a “SHOULD”? If the Map-Request has S-bit=0 it mean that there is
no AD, hence no OTK, how can the ITR decrypt the reply?????
It MUST discard…..
If S-bit = 0 there's no Authentication Data. The Map-reply is in clear,
and can be read.
Here again the SHOULD leaves open to ITR local policy that can be strict
(drop anything not authenticated) or loose (accept unauthenticated
map-reply).
There are use cases where LISP-SEC is not deployed everywhere, where the
ITR might have to use loose policy.
Upon receiving a Map-Reply, the ITR must verify the integrity of both
the EID-AD and the PKT-AD, and MUST discard the Map-Reply if one of
the integrity checks fails.
The integrity of the EID-AD is verified using the locally stored ITR-
OTK to re-compute the HMAC of the EID-AD using the algorithm
specified in the EID HMAC ID field. If the EID HMAC ID field does
not match the Requested HMAC ID the ITR SHOULD discard the Map-Reply
Why is this a SHOULD? If it supports the HMAC Algorithm why not
decrypt? Shouldn’t this be a “MAY”, according to internal policy?
because this could be used by an attacker to force weaker HMACs (e.g.
MD5). The SHOULD leaves open the door to not discarding, according to
local policy.
and send, at the first opportunity it needs to, a new Map-Request
with a different Requested HMAC ID field, according to ITR's local
policy. The ITR MUST set the EID HMAC ID field to 0 before computing
the HMAC.
Shouldn’t the MS do the same thing? Otherwise different values will be
obtained. This is not specified in the MS functioning description.
good catch. Actually it's a typo here, the EID HMAC field should be set
to 0 (that is consistent with section 5.7), not the EID HMAC ID that
should not be touched.
The ITR MUST set the EID HMAC ID field to 0 before computing
the HMAC.
should change to
The scope of the HMAC operation covers the
entire EID-AD, from the EID-AD Length field to the EID HMAC field,
which must be set to 0 before the computation.
To verify the integrity of the PKT-AD, first the MS-OTK is derived
from the locally stored ITR-OTK using the algorithm specified in the
KDF ID field. This is because the PKT-AD is generated by the ETR
using the MS-OTK. If the KDF ID in the Map-Reply does not match the
KDF ID requested in the Map-Request, the ITR SHOULD discard the Map-
Reply and send, at the first opportunity it needs to, a new Map-
Request with a different KDF ID, according to ITR's local policy.
The derived MS-OTK is then used to re-compute the HMAC of the PKT-AD
using the Algorithm specified in the PKT HMAC ID field. If the PKT
HMAC ID field does not match the Requested HMAC ID the ITR SHOULD
discard the Map-Reply and send, at the first opportunity it needs to,
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a new Map-Request with a different Requested HMAC ID according to
ITR's local policy.
Each individual Map-Reply EID-record is considered valid only if: (1)
both EID-AD and PKT-AD are valid, and (2) the intersection of the
EID-prefix in the Map-Reply EID-record with one of the EID-prefixes
contained in the EID-AD is not empty. After identifying the Map-
Reply record as valid, the ITR sets the EID-prefix in the Map-Reply
record to the value of the intersection set computed before, and adds
the Map-Reply EID-record to its EID-to-RLOC cache, as described in
[RFC6830]. An example of Map-Reply record validation is provided in
Section 5.4.1.
The ITR SHOULD send SMR triggered Map-Requests over the mapping
system in order to receive a secure Map-Reply.
I do not understand this “SHOULD”. This has consequences in the
choice how to react to SMR. This is a local policy.
_If_ the ITR wants to protect Map-Requests using LISP-SEC, than SMR
triggered Map-Request MUST be sent through the mapping system.
so the _if_ is what makes that MUST a SHOULD... According to local
policy the ITR SHOULD send the SMR.
If an ITR accepts
piggybacked Map-Replies, it SHOULD also send a Map-Request over the
mapping system in order to securely verify the piggybacked Map-Reply.
Same as above.
5.4.1. Map-Reply Record Validation
The payload of a Map-Reply may contain multiple EID-records. The
whole Map-Reply is signed by the ETR, with the PKT HMAC, to provide
integrity protection and origin authentication to the EID-prefix
records claimed by the ETR. The Authentication Data field of a Map-
Reply may contain multiple EID-records in the EID-AD. The EID-AD is
signed by the Map-Server, with the EID HMAC, to provide integrity
protection and origin authentication to the EID-prefix records
inserted by the Map-Server.
Upon receiving a Map-Reply with the S-bit set, the ITR first checks
the validity of both the EID HMAC and of the PKT-AD HMAC. If either
one of the HMACs is not valid, a log message is issued and the Map-
Reply is not processed any further.
I think “log message" is too much implementation specific.
If there is a notification, and how this notification is done, is
implementation specific IMHO.
Ok. 'a log message is issued' will change to 'a log action should be
taken'. The point is that there could be an attack behind it, and we
want to record the event
If both HMACs are valid, the ITR
proceeds with validating each individual EID-record claimed by the
ETR by computing the intersection of each one of the EID-prefix
contained in the payload of the Map-Reply with each one of the EID-
prefixes contained in the EID-AD. An EID-record is valid only if at
least one of the intersections is not the empty set.
For instance, the Map-Reply payload contains 3 mapping record EID-
prefixes:
1.1.1.0/24
1.1.2.0/24
1.2.0.0/16
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The EID-AD contains two EID-prefixes:
1.1.2.0/24
1.2.3.0/24
The EID-record with EID-prefix 1.1.1.0/24 is not processed since it
is not included in any of the EID-ADs signed by the Map-Server. A
log message is issued.
I think “log message" is too much implementation specific.
If there is a notification, and how this notification is done, is
implementation specific IMHO.
ok. Same as above.
The EID-record with EID-prefix 1.1.2.0/24 is stored in the map-cache
because it matches the second EID-prefix contained in the EID-AD.
The EID-record with EID-prefix 1.2.0.0/16 is not processed since it
is not included in any of the EID-ADs signed by the Map-Server. A
log message is issued.
I think “log message" is too much implementation specific.
If there is a notification, and how this notification is done, is
implementation specific IMHO.
ok. Same as above
In this last example the ETR is trying to
over claim the EID-prefix 1.2.0.0/16, but the Map-Server authorized
only 1.2.3.0/24, hence the EID-record is discarded.
Reading the example I am not sure I would follow this behaviour.
Only 1 record out of 3 is valid so why should I actually trust the ETR
instead of throwing everything away?
Can you explain ???
The other two records are validated by the MS, so there is no reason to
throw those away.
5.4.2. PITR Processing
The processing performed by a PITR is equivalent to the processing of
an ITR. However, if the PITR is directly connected to the ALT,
This would be LISP+ALT. Pleas add a reference to 6836.
ok.
the
PITR performs the functions of both the ITR and the Map-Resolver
forwarding the Map-Request encapsulated in an ECM header that
includes the Authentication Data fields as described in Section 5.6.
5.5. Encrypting and Decrypting an OTK
MS-OTK confidentiality is required in the path between the Map-Server
and the ETR, the MS-OTK SHOULD
If confidentiality is required why there is not a MUST?
Same.
be encrypted using the preconfigured
key shared between the Map-Server and the ETR for the purpose of
securing ETR registration [RFC6833]. Similarly, if ITR-OTK
confidentiality is required in the path between the ITR and the Map-
Resolver, the ITR-OTK SHOULD
Again, if confidentiality is required why there is not a MUST?
Same.
be encrypted with a key shared between
the ITR and the Map-Resolver.
The OTK is encrypted using the algorithm specified in the OTK
Encryption ID field. When the AES Key Wrap algorithm is used to
encrypt a 128-bit OTK, according to [RFC3339],
The correct RFC is 3394.
ok.
the AES Key Wrap
Initialization Value MUST be set to 0xA6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6 (64 bits).
The output of the AES Key Wrap operation is 192-bit long. The most
significant 64-bit are copied in the One-Time Key Preamble field,
while the 128 less significant bits are copied in the One-Time Key
field of the LISP-SEC Authentication Data.
When decrypting an encrypted OTK the receiver MUST verify that the
Initialization Value resulting from the AES Key Wrap decryption
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operation is equal to 0xA6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6. If this verification fails
the receiver MUST discard the entire message.
When a 128-bit OTK is sent unencrypted the OTK Encryption ID is set
to NULL_KEY_WRAP_128, and the OTK Preamble is set to
0x0000000000000000 (64 bits).
5.6. Map-Resolver Processing
Upon receiving an encapsulated Map-Request with the S-bit set, the
Map-Resolver decapsulates the ECM message. The ITR-OTK, if
encrypted, is decrypted as specified in Section 5.5.
The Map-Resolver, as specified in [RFC6833], originates a new ECM
header with the S-bit set, that contains the unencrypted ITR-OTK, as
specified in Section 5.5, and the other data derived from the ECM
Authentication Data of the received encapsulated Map-Request.
Few points on this last paragraph:
- You assume that there is no need of confidentiality inside the
Mapping System?
- Why not stating that encryption inside the mapping system is mapping
system specify and out of scope of this document?
ok. as it was pointed out above.
- Why are you assuming that all of the Mapping system will use ECM?
Future Mapping system may use soemthos different. The important point
is to ship the AD along.
good point, and I agree with your suggestion to fix this below.
The Map-Resolver then forwards
to whom?
ok. add 'to the Map-Server'
the received Map-Request, encapsulated
in the new ECM header that includes the newly computed Authentication
Data fields.
As for my comment of the previous paragraph I would be more generic
stating that the MR will hand over the request to the mapping system.
You can still provide the example of DDT using ECM.
right.
5.7. Map-Server Processing
Upon receiving an ECM encapsulated Map-Request with the S-bit set,
the Map-Server process the Map-Request according to the value of the
S-bit contained in the Map-Register sent by the ETR during
registration.
If the S-bit contained in the Map-Register was clear the Map-Server
decapsulates the ECM and generates a new ECM encapsulated Map-Request
that does not contain an ECM Authentication Data, as specified in
[RFC6830]. The Map-Server does not perform any further LISP-SEC
processing.
This equivalent to not using LISP-SEC. Please specify that the
Map-Reply will be not protected.
ok.
If the S-bit contained in the Map-Register was set the Map-Server
decapsulates the ECM and generates a new ECM Authentication Data.
The Authentication Data includes the OTK-AD and the EID-AD, that
contains EID-prefix authorization information, that are ultimately
sent to the requesting ITR.
The Map-Server updates the OTK-AD by deriving a new OTK (MS-OTK) from
the ITR-OTK received with the Map-Request. MS-OTK is derived
applying the key derivation function specified in the KDF ID field.
If the algorithm specified in the KDF ID field is not supported, the
Map-Server uses a different algorithm to derive the key and updates
the KDF ID field accordingly.
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The Map-Server and the ETR MUST be configured with a shared key for
mapping registration according to [RFC6833]. If MS-OTK
confidentiality is required, then the MS-OTK SHOULD be encrypted,
Again, if confidentiality is required why there is not a MUST?
same as above.
by
wrapping the MS-OTK with the algorithm specified by the OTK
Encryption ID field as specified in Section 5.5.
The Map-Server includes in the EID-AD the longest match registered
EID-prefix for the destination EID, and an HMAC of this EID-prefix.
The HMAC is keyed with the ITR-OTK contained in the received ECM
Authentication Data, and the HMAC algorithm is chosen according to
the Requested HMAC ID field. If The Map-Server does not support this
algorithm, the Map-Server uses a different algorithm and specifies it
in the EID HMAC ID field. The scope of the HMAC operation covers the
entire EID-AD, from the EID-AD Length field to the EID HMAC field,
which must be set to 0 before the computation.
The Map-Server then forwards the updated ECM encapsulated Map-
Request, that contains the OTK-AD, the EID-AD, and the received Map-
Request to an authoritative ETR as specified in [RFC6830].
5.7.1. Map-Server Processing in Proxy mode
If the Map-Server is in proxy mode, it generates a Map-Reply, as
specified in [RFC6830], with the S-bit set to 1. The Map-Reply
includes the Authentication Data that contains the EID-AD, computed
as specified in Section 5.7, as well as the PKT-AD computed as
specified in Section 5.8.
5.8. ETR Processing
Upon receiving an ECM encapsulated Map-Request with the S-bit set,
the ETR decapsulates the ECM message. The OTK field, if encrypted,
is decrypted as specified in Section 5.5 to obtain the unencrypted
MS-OTK.
The ETR then generates a Map-Reply as specified in [RFC6830] and
includes the Authentication Data that contains the EID-AD, as
received in the encapsulated Map-Request, as well as the PKT-AD.
The EID-AD is copied from the Authentication Data of the received
encapsulated Map-Request.
The PKT-AD contains the HMAC of the whole Map-Reply packet, keyed
with the MS-OTK and computed using the HMAC algorithm specified in
the Requested HMAC ID field of the received encapsulated Map-Request.
If the ETR does not support the Requested HMAC ID, it uses a
different algorithm and updates the PKT HMAC ID field accordingly.
The scope of the HMAC operation covers the entire PKT-AD, from the
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Map-Reply Type field to the PKT HMAC field, which must be set to 0
before the computation.
Finally the ETR sends the Map-Reply to the requesting ITR as
specified in [RFC6830].
6. Security Considerations
6.1. Mapping System Security
The LISP-SEC threat model described in Section 3, assumes that the
LISP Mapping System is working properly and eventually delivers Map-
Request messages to a Map-Server that is authoritative for the
requested EID.
As for a previous comment, can you elaborate if OTK confidentiality is
required in the mapping system and what are the consequences?
ok.
Map-Register security, including the right for a LISP entity to
register an EID-prefix or to claim presence at an RLOC, is out of the
scope of LISP-SEC.
6.2. Random Number Generation
The ITR-OTK MUST be generated by a properly seeded pseudo-random (or
strong random) source. See [RFC4086] for advice on generating
security-sensitive random data
6.3. Map-Server and ETR Colocation
If the Map-Server and the ETR are colocated, LISP-SEC does not
provide protection from overclaiming attacks mounted by the ETR.
However, in this particular case, since the ETR is within the trust
boundaries of the Map-Server, ETR's overclaiming attacks are not
included in the threat model.
7. IANA Considerations
This section is not conform to RFC 5226.
There right way to go is to ask IANA to create three new registries,
for HMAC, Key Wrap, and Key Derivation functions.
Define what is the allocation process (in light of the size of the
field FCFS should not cause any problem IMHO)
Then ask to populate the registries as already described.
Ok, so each one of the sections 7.x will say: IANA is requested to
create a new <registry-name> registry for use ...
7.1. HMAC functions
The following HMAC ID values are defined by this memo for use as
Requested HMAC ID, EID HMAC ID, and PKT HMAC ID in the LISP-SEC
Authentication Data:
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Name Number Defined In
-------------------------------------------------
NONE 0
AUTH-HMAC-SHA-1-96 1 [RFC2104]
AUTH-HMAC-SHA-256-128 2 [RFC4634]
values 2-65535 are reserved to IANA.
HMAC Functions
AUTH-HMAC-SHA-1-96 MUST be supported, AUTH-HMAC-SHA-256-128 should be
supported.
7.2. Key Wrap Functions
The following OTK Encryption ID values are defined by this memo for
use as OTK key wrap algorithms ID in the LISP-SEC Authentication
Data:
Name Number Defined In
-------------------------------------------------
NULL-KEY-WRAP-128 1
AES-KEY-WRAP-128 2 [RFC3394]
values 0 and 3-65535 are reserved to IANA.
Key Wrap Functions
NULL-KEY-WRAP-128, and AES-KEY-WRAP-128 MUST be supported.
NULL-KEY-WRAP-128 is used to carry an unencrypted 128-bit OTK, with a
64-bit preamble set to 0x0000000000000000 (64 bits).
7.3. Key Derivation Functions
The following KDF ID values are defined by this memo for use as KDF
ID in the LISP-SEC Authentication Data:
Name Number Defined In
-------------------------------------------------
NONE 0
HKDF-SHA1-128 1 [RFC5869]
values 2-65535 are reserved to IANA.
Key Derivation Functions
HKDF-SHA1-128 MUST be supported
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8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge Pere Monclus, Dave Meyer, Dino
Farinacci, Brian Weis, David McGrew, Darrel Lewis and Landon Curt
Noll for their valuable suggestions provided during the preparation
of this document.
9. Normative References
Please Check your reference, this is the output if the nits tool:
Checking references for intended status: Experimental
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
== Missing Reference: 'RFC3339' is mentioned on line 602, but not
defined
== Missing Reference: 'RFC4634' is mentioned on line 752, but not
defined
** Obsolete undefined reference: RFC 4634 (Obsoleted by RFC 6234)
ok.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, DOI 10.17487/RFC3394,
September 2002, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3394>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC6830] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "The
Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", RFC 6830,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6830, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6830>.
[RFC6833] Fuller, V. and D. Farinacci, "Locator/ID Separation
Protocol (LISP) Map-Server Interface", RFC 6833,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6833, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6833>.
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[RFC7835] Saucez, D., Iannone, L., and O. Bonaventure, "Locator/ID
Separation Protocol (LISP) Threat Analysis", RFC 7835,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7835, April 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7835>.
Authors' Addresses
Fabio Maino
Cisco Systems
170 Tasman Drive
San Jose, California 95134
USA
Email:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
Vina Ermagan
Cisco Systems
170 Tasman Drive
San Jose, California 95134
USA
Email:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
Albert Cabellos
Technical University of Catalonia
c/ Jordi Girona s/n
Barcelona 08034
Spain
Email:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
Damien Saucez
INRIA
2004 route des Lucioles - BP 93
Sophia Antipolis
France
Email:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
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