On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 8:19 AM, Jon Crowcroft <[email protected]> wrote: > beware of sidechannel attacks - eg. a sequence of efficient routes can > determine a sequence of locations just from latency/rtt estimation > (observe outbound data and likely return path ack packets) - you want > privacy, you're gonna pay >
Yep, we also know there is a lot of effort being done to extract information from cipher text like apply machine learning to the data. As compute and data acquisition techniques advance, attacks on the Internet only get more sophisticated. Work will always be needed to mitigate new attacks and that will have cost. It's a never ending problem, but it's worth it to continually try to solve IMHO. Tom > On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 5:14 PM, Tom Herbert <[email protected]> wrote: >> On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 10:01 PM, Jon Crowcroft >> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> what we need is compact onion routing - maybe we could call it garlic >>> routing. >>> >>> in all seriousness, if people are worried about privacy with regards >>> network operators, or state actors co-ercing network operators, at >>> this level, that is what you want. otherwise forget about efficient >>> mobile routing - the fact is that the signature of the set of >>> locations you visit is enough to re-identify a node pretty quickly - >>> its been done (see wetherall's work on this a few years back on simply >>> looking at sequences of wifi AP associations, without bothing with end >>> system mac addr, to uniquely matc individual (indeed, find their home) >>> - you have to get the threat model appropriately...and proportioately >> >> Jon, >> >> The threat is not limited to coming from network operators, it is >> basically from the whole Internet. IP addresses must be sent as clear >> text, and when they encode personally identifiable information then >> that can be used by third parties to compromise privacy. In mobile >> addresses, the threat is both comprising identity and location of the >> user. Identity can be compromised when the same address (or device >> specific prefix in case of RFC4941 addresses) is reused for different >> flows, location is compromised when an address encodes a locator that >> can be used to determine specific location. There are publicized >> examples of third parties using IP addresses to expose identity and >> location (e.g. >> https://theintercept.com/2018/03/26/facebook-data-ice-immigration/). >> >> In order to provide privacy in addressing, IP addresses need to be >> purged of PII. This likely entails minimizing aggregation and a high >> frequency of address change in a host. On the surface, this does seem >> to be in conflict with "efficient mobile routing" as you mentioned, >> however I don't believe that efficient routing is an acceptable trade >> off for not providing adequate privacy to users. Alternatives that >> achieve both goals should be investigated. >> draft-herbert-ipv6-prefix-address-privacy-00 suggests "hidden >> aggregation" as one possibility. >> >> Tom >> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 11:42 PM, Erik Nordmark <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> This is a rough draft, but hopefully it can stimulate more discussion >>>> around >>>> privacy considerations. >>>> >>>> -------- Forwarded Message -------- >>>> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt >>>> Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 15:34:11 -0700 >>>> From: [email protected] >>>> To: Erik Nordmark <[email protected]> >>>> >>>> >>>> A new version of I-D, draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt >>>> has been successfully submitted by Erik Nordmark and posted to the >>>> IETF repository. >>>> >>>> Name: draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy >>>> Revision: 00 >>>> Title: Privacy issues in ID/locator separation systems >>>> Document date: 2018-07-02 >>>> Group: Individual Submission >>>> Pages: 6 >>>> URL: >>>> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt >>>> Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy/ >>>> Htmlized: >>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00 >>>> Htmlized: >>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy >>>> >>>> >>>> Abstract: >>>> There exists several protocols and proposals for identifier/locator >>>> split which have some form of control plane by which participating >>>> nodes can use to share their current id to locator information with >>>> their peers. This document explores some of the privacy >>>> considerations for such a system. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of >>>> submission >>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. >>>> >>>> The IETF Secretariat >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> 5gangip mailing list >>>> [email protected] >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> 5gangip mailing list >>> [email protected] >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip >> >> _______________________________________________ >> 5gangip mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip _______________________________________________ lisp mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lisp
