A few comments
John B. Reynolds wrote:
> Registries are also businesses, and have had even less difficulty than TM
> owners in making themselves heard, yet there has been no opposition to
> granting them a constituency.
Good point. My preference would have been for a more flat membership model for
the DNSO. I have been consistent about this if you've seen my posts in the past.
I recognize this as a flaw. But if you're going to create constituencies at all,
registries are the key element because their activities are what are supposed to
be coordinated by ICANN. In my worldview, registries "own" their own name spaces
under their TLD, and just as there can be no taxation without representation, so
there can be no regulation of the namespace of thewe registries without their
participation and approval. In other words, if one maintains any semblence of
the old (and fading?) idea that the chief purpose of ICANN is to facilitate
technical coordination, then the dnso is mainly about how registries undertake
to coordinate their activites.
Another point of differentiation: a registry constituency does not reflect a
policy position. It corresponds to a functional group. An "anti-counterfeiting"
constituency represents a political position, similar to, say, a "free
expression constituency" or a "anti-abortion" constituency or a "pro-censorship"
constituency. Registries may have widely varying positions. Therefore, by
creating a registry constituency one is not quite so blatantly stacking the
policy deck.
BTW, not all registries are businesses. Some are still small-scale
administrative functions housed in, say, university departments. Minor cavil.
They will eventually become businesses if they're smart.
> So, if ICANN's membership is limited to businesses, you are willing to live
> with the DNSO's being similarly limited?
It won't be limited to business. But if by some fluke it is, then yes, I would.
At least it would be consistent.
> DNSO constituencies are likely to divide over political lines rather than
> functional ones. There is also much more at stake from a policy standpoint
> in the DNSO case. Both of these factors substantially increase the
> probability of conflict.
Conflict is built into the decisions that have to be made. The DNSO Washington
draft will have conflict between the TM constituency and the registries
constituency. There will be conflict within the business constituency. I do not
see how either structure avoids conflict or can avoid conflict. If anything, the
more fluid structure of the Paris draft forces them to work out the conflicts
before making a decision, rather than simply outvoting your colleagues.
> > I share some of these concerns but do not see them as a show
> > stopper, just as a reflection of the paranoia that pervades this process.
>
> Opposition to an explicit registry veto is rooted in "paranoia", but
> assertions that giving business and trademark interests 1/3 representation
> somehow grants them "control" are not? Sorry, doesn't scan.
You misunderstood me. My point was that the paranoia is in the people who insist
on fair hearing panels, not in those who oppose a registry veto. The advocates
of fair hearing panels believe that they can protect themselves against any Bad
Things if procedural safeguards are sitting there. If you don't trust registries
then you have every reason to be concerned about a registry veto. But see above
about why a registry veto may be justified.
> > > The flaws in the Washington draft are relatively minor by comparison.
> > > Business interests are overrepresented, and there is no mechanism for
> > > individual users or domain holders to participate directly
> > (Section I.B).
> >
> > That's minor, eh?
>
> By comparison with the outright registry veto in the Paris draft, yes.
Well, let's be more careful with language here. A 3/4 vote is not a veto. Not
all registries are the same. I think the point behind this provision is that the
policies that go up from dnso to ICANN have to command substantial support. They
cannot be simply an ephemeral majority, and registries would have to implement
the decisions and have a direct property stake in the outcome that other
interests may not have.
> Under the Paris draft proposal, if business and trademark interests
> constitute a majority of the membership, they will likely be in a position
> to define the constituencies such that they will be guaranteed a majority on
> the Names Council. Even with the ambiguity in Section I.E, the Washington
> draft provides greater protection against special interest capture than does
> the Paris draft.
No, because of the registry veto.
> As an advocate of expansion of the TLD space and policies that would protect
> domain registrants from exploitation based on registry lock-in, I prefer to
> take my chances with the business community than with the incumbent TLD
> registries.
It is a legitimate position and a legitimate disagreement. May the best DNSO
win.
--MM
