Jay Fenello wrote:
>
> At 2/8/99, 08:34 AM, John B. Reynolds wrote:
> >
> >
> >Jay Fenello wrote:
> >>
> >> At 2/7/99, 06:15 PM, John B. Reynolds wrote:
> >> >
> >> >Milton Mueller wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> The Paris draft group, on the other hand, was responsive to this
> >> >> same criticism.
> >> >> I commend them for this.
> >> >
> >> >On the other hand, the Paris group was completely unresponsive
> >> to criticism
> >> >that its veto provisions gave too much power to registries.
> >>
> >>
> >> As an exercise in consensus building . . .
> >>
> >> How do you envision ICANN enforcing
> >> policies onto the registries?
> >>
> >> Jay.
> >>
> >
> >If all else fails, ICANN has the authority to remove them from its root
> >zone. It's admittedly the 'nuclear option', but it's there.
>
>
> Implicit in the Paris Draft is an entire system
> of enforcement provisions designed to supplement
> your "nuclear option" (which, btw, would harm the
> innocent domain name holder's of the nuked TLD).
>
> This is the reason for the "Pre-review" process.
>
> If you don't like the provision as written, then
> please suggest an alternate one that addresses
> this enforcement issue.
>
> Jay.
>
I have already indicated that the replacement Section 5.9 proposed by AIP
and NSI would be acceptable to me. Anything beyond that is an undue
constraint upon the DNSO and ICANN on behalf of a special interest group,
not an "enforcement provision".
ICANN's enforcement mechanisms and the real-world constraints upon its
actions both stem from its operation of the authoritative DNS root zone. So
long as ICANN's conditions are reasonable, registries will comply in order
to stay in the root. If ICANN were to attempt to enforce unreasonable
conditions or to begin removing TLDs capriciously, it would quite soon
thereafter discover that its root zone was no longer recognized as
authoritative by the Internet community.
