>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>From: Antoun Nabhan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: Re: Analysis of the Model Proposals/White Paper
>In-Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
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>At 11:59 PM 2/28/99 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>Here are some comments on your membership commentary
>>
>>> >I. History
>>
>>> >The initial impetus for the White Paper -- and ultimately, ICANN -- came in=
>>> > July 1997.
>>
>>This section gives the rather misleading impression that the Clinton administration
>>decided to do something on its own initiative and actually had a policy. In fact, it
>>was forced into action by external pressure, primarily because the faction-fight
>>between the gTLD-MoU advocates and the NSI/proprietary registry supporters had
>reached
>>a point where it could no longer be ignored. This may seem marginal to the purpose of
>>your document, but it is not. In fact, virtually everything about ICANN is shaped by
>>the politicization of IANA's functions that emerged from the ongoing battle between
>>these two factions, which predates the White Paper process by two years.
>
>That's one way of interpreting the history, but one might also say that IANA's
>functions became political in nature rather than artificially "politicized" as domain
>names and IP access became commercially & politically valuable resources. The current
>sticking points around ICANN aren't the same fracture lines of the gTLD-MoU/NSI
>fight, which suggests to me that - maybe - that earlier dispute was just a catalyst
>for some other impending issues.
>
>Anyway, the document reads the way it does simply because I didn't want to include
>the whole history of NSFNet/ARPANET/BBN/IANA/Jon Postel's Childhood Influences. One
>could make a pretty good argument that the early participation of BBN and ARPA (for
>example) still reverberate into our present debate, but for the purposes of
>understanding where the White Paper came from and why it was written, I thought that
>going as far back as the Green Paper covered most of what was necessary. I'm not
>trying the hide the ball or make the Clinton Administration look better than it
>should (is that *possible* nowadays?), just trying to keep the document a manageable
>length. Perhaps you could explain to me what point of White Paper interpretation in
>the paper fails because it is not sensitive enough to the history of the gTLD
>conflict?
>
>>> >II. How Well do the Model Proposals Fit the White Paper?
>>> >
>>> >B. Stability: =20
>>> >The WP stresses the value of continued Internet reliability. A=
>>> > standards-making body like the ICANN Board will, presumably, set better=
>>> > policies and adopt better standards when parties who understand the=
>>> > underlying technology are diligent participants.
>>
>>Uhhh...if a "standard" is defined by someone who does not understand the technology
>and
>>its operational consequences, it will not become a standard. It will just be words on
>>paper. Coordination requires the mutual consent of the coordinated parties. The point
>>is to maintain the level of decentralization and bottom-up coordination that ensures
>>that it is essentially voluntary adoption, and not central decree, that gets
>standards
>>adopted.
>
>I agree - bad standards, and the bodies that make them, should and will just go away.
>(Of course, I'm typing this on an Windows 95 box - hypocrisy?) But wouldn't you agree
>that it's better to have someone proposing good standards that everyone wants to
>adopt than have multiple failed attempts at standards-setting? My best example here
>would be the Unix vendor community - more standardization, done properly, would be a
>huge boon to the OS and all its vendors.
>
>>> > A successful plan will
>>> > provide a significant incentive for infrastructure providers (telcos, ISPs,
>>> > networking equipment makers, etc.) to get involved in the ICANN process.
>>> > Plans that allow providers to vote will provide this incentive in greater
>>> > measure than those that only allow providers nonvoting participation; plans
>>> > that allow nonvoting participation are more likely to draw infrastructure
>>> > providers than plans that exclude them altogether. Thus the "Organization"
>>> > plan is more likely to draw large organizations into the dialogue than the
>>> > "Individual" plan.
>>> >
>>> >Supporting Organizations do provide explicitly for input from networking=
>>> > professionals and technical experts.
>>
>>In case you haven't noticed, the DNSO has virtually nothing to do with technology and
>>is entirely about political representation--i.e., finding a distribution of power
>that
>>will allow groups who want to influence *policy* to do so.
>>
>>Also, I believe you are fundamentally mistaken if you believe that it is the
>membership
>>structure iself that will give infrastructure providers (and other networking
>>professionals, e.g., equipment manufacturers and ISPs) an incentive to become
>involved.
>>This betrays a certain lack of historical and institutional knowledge about
>>telecom/info industry standards bodies. The incentive to become involved is based on
>>what the organization does or can do; i.e., what real power it has to become an arena
>
>Yes, that's right. Keep in mind that I'm writing this report in the context of the
>Membership Advisory Committee process - membership structure isn't the be-all and
>end-all of incentives for involvement, but that's the thing I'm writing about here.
>
>This paper also assumes that a successful ICANN would have the sort of
>standards-setting power that would make it an organization that infrastructure
>providers wouldn't want to ignore. The cause-and-effect does get somewhat circular
>here. ICANN is more likely to be effective if its membership includes the people who
>understand the issues and is genuinely inclusive of all parties.
>
>
>>for effective cooperation/ coordination/standard setting. For example, you imply
>below
>>that an individual membership structure may not provide enough "voice" to
>>organizations. This is easily refuted: are there corporate memberships in IETF? Has
>>this organization served as an effective forum for cooperation and standard setting
>or
>>not? IETF has no formal membership structure to speak of, at least not one that
>>specifically recognizes organizations. Yet it works because corporations know that it
>>is a legitimate, effective, arena in which standards can be developed. There are,
>>conversely, many small standards forums that emphasize corporate memberships that
>have
>>never developed the critical mass required to serve as an effective forum for
>>international cooperation.
>
>That's a compelling point. I'd ask you two questions: first, is ICANN really the same
>as IETF? Second, what is the mechanism by which corporations express their views to
>IETF? For the second, I'll argue: most IETF members come as individuals, but are
>commercial technologists. So, they really do represent the viewpoints of
>corporations; they have the mindset and are exposed to problems that the corporations
>face. The IETF members don't vote strictly according to the venal interests of the
>companies they work for, but they at least bring the concerns to the table. If ICANN
>membership were strictly individual, the corporations, etc. would have the same
>avenue.
>
>>> > So, are the SOs enough? As it
>>> > stands, the equal numbers of At-Large and SO-appointed Directors could
>>> > produce compromise or deadlock.
>>
>>This assumes a level of homogeneity among the SO representatives on the one hand, and
>>the At-large representatives on the other, that almost certainly will not exist.
>Given
>>the culture of the Internet, individual members are as likely (more likely) to elect
>a
>>Vint Cerf as an Esther Dyson as At-large board members. And the SOs are as likely to
>>elect non-technical businesspeople or politicians, especially the DNSO.
>>
>>> >Any structure that prevents this deadlock, however, will allow either=
>>> > At-Large Directors or SO-appointed directors more control over ICANN=
>>> > policy.
>>
>>This is a non-issue, for the reasons stated above.
>>
>>> >Voice: Most corporations and associations will not qualify for membership=
>>> > in an SO.
>>
>>Huh? Have you read the DNSO proposals? Have you looked at the members of the address
>>registries?
>
>Most corporations/associations in the world. Meaning people who aren't primarily in
>information technology or telecom.
>
>>> > One outstanding problem is that ISPs are not, as a class, represented by any=
>>> > of the proposed SO structures.
>>
>>I agree that buy-in by ISPs is fundamental to the success of what ICANN is supposed
>to
>>do. But I cannot tell from this whether you understand that ISPs have significant
>power
>>over ICANN, regardless of membership structure, via their decisions to point to its
>>root servers. ICANN will maintain their cooperation not by giving them special powers
>>via membership structure (something they never had in the old IANA), but by serving
>as
>>an effective center for coordinating resource assignments. In other words, if ICANN
>>does its job right, and stops trying to be a regulator and political governor, it
>will
>>win the support and cooperation of ISPs.
>
>Yup, I'm well aware of what ISPs can do with their DNS config. *Personally*, I think
>that the easiest way to coordinate resource assignments given the current Internet
>architecture is to have input directly from the ISPs. They know what's going on out
>there; they should vote and make policy somehow. Let me put it this way: would you
>prefer that ISPs be given a vote somewhere - either in an SO or in At-large - or not
>given a vote anywhere?
>
>>The most likely factor to destabilize ICANN is its apparent determination to become a
>>regulator and policy maker--to solve trademark disputes, dictate business models, set
>>codes of conduct, etc. This embroils it in political maneuvers that are diametricaly
>>opposed to its legitimacy and credibility as a technical coordination body.
>
>Yeah, ICANN wears two hats - technical and political. That seems to me implicit in
>the White Paper's charge to ICANN:
>"- determining the policy and allocation of IP number blocks,
>- maintaining the Internet root server system,
>- determining the policy for adding new Top Level Domains (TLDs),
>- and coordinating the assignment of technological parameters."
>
>Those middle two have become very political topics. How do you get around that?
>
>>Many of us would be perfectly willing to turn ICANN over to organizational/ corporate
>>membership classes, *if* we knew for a fact that its activities would be confined to
>>narrow technical coordination, within a framework of transferable property rights
>that
>>created an efficient market for the resources it controls. Since ICANN--and the
>faction
>
>That part about "transferable property rights" is Pandora's Box. We (Internet users)
>don't have that in place right now, but we still have to register new domain names,
>etc. in the meantime.
>
>>that has won effective control of it in the short term--seems determined to do much
>>more than that, we must demand what are essentially political remedies:
>representation,
>>procedural safeguards, etc.
>
>So please help craft appropriate safeguards, etc.! ;-)
>
>>> > C. Private, Bottom-Up Coordination
>>> >
>>> >Funding: The WP notes that "the new corporation's activities would need to=
>>> > be open to all persons who are directly affected by the entity, with no=
>>> > undue financial barriers to participation or unreasonable restrictions on=
>>> > participation based on technical or other such requirements." The first=
>>> > part of this requirement, "undue financial barriers," raises the question=
>>> > of how high the membership fee may be without being "undue." For example,=
>>> > the "Organization" model's >$1000 minimum membership fee for corporations=
>>> > might exclude many smaller e-commerce businesses, who would nonetheless=
>>> > have a financial stake in ICANN decisions.
>>
>>The connection between financial support and membership is probably the most
>important
>>and difficult issue you have to deal with. There are no easy answers but I encourage
>>you to look at the way existing standards organiztions do this. ATIS bases its
>>membership charge upon the revenues of the corporation. Some pay $200,000 , but it
>also
>>has a <$200 (if I recall correctly) membership available for individuals. I would
>>rather see ICANN funded by memberships than by "taxes" on IP/domain name services. I
>>believe (and this is an off-the-cuff judgment) that its incentives are better aligned
>>with the public interest that way. But this requires a lot more thinking and analysis
>>-- a fusion of economics expertise as well as a better historical knowledge of how
>>standards organizations have worked. Transactions coss economics, anyone? Do they
>teach
>>that at Harvard?
>
>The MAC is considering the system you're talking about. Representatives from
>developing nations have argued against it. They worry that any membership fee for
>individuals excludes large numbers of users - those with little disposable income -
>from participating in the voting.
>
>If I understand what you're saying about the transaction costs, then it cuts both
>ways: there's a cost of providing domain name and IPA allocation, along with the
>policy development behind those processes; that's really the cost that ICANN should
>recover, since that's what it provides to the public. The cost of running elections,
>etc. should be small compared to that. To say it another way: ICANN without domain
>name/IPA transactions is pretty pointless. ICANN without membership is dangerous.
>
>You also seem to be saying that organizations should contribute in proportion to the
>burden they place on ICANN, but that again seems to point to a metric like number of
>IPs or something like that. What other standards organizations would you suggest I/we
>look at?
>
>I dunno, I've been up all night. Am I missing your point?
>
>>> > ICANN could be funded solely through a percentage=
>>> > of domain registration fees, channeled through the SOs;
>>
>>Channeled through the SOs? ??? Are you implying that the DNSO will be an operational
>>entity that collects fees from every domain name registrant? Doesn't square with
>what's
>>shaping up in either proposal. Thank God.
>
>Yes, that was an option on the table at the time the document was written.
>
>>
>>> >Election Oversight Committee: Each of the three models contemplates a large=
>>> > number -- perhaps hundreds of thousands -- of potential nominees.
>>
>>Are you joking? You'll be extraordinarily lucky if you get hundreds of thousands of
>>*members*. Simply restricting nominees to "members in good standing" solves most of
>the
>>problem. Think in terms of thousands of members and, at most, hundreds of nominees.
>
>Wasn't joking at the time. I think the MAC will talk more about this at the open
>meeting today.
>
>>No "winnowing" please. That kind of process invites abuse. You simply need to define
>>clear eligibility criteria and apply them.
>
>Yup. I think that the MAC is leaning away from a Election Committee for just this
>reason. Personally, it seems like this winnowing process is an anti-chaos device, and
>at this stage in ICANN's life, it's worth putting up with a lot of chaos to garner a
>smidgen of legitimacy.
>
>>M I L T O N M U E L L E R S Y R A C U S E U N I V E R S I T Y
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
>>School of Information Studies http://istweb.syr.edu/~mueller/
>>
>>
>>
>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Antoun Nabhan * "To understand privacy, one must first
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] * understand shame" - Janna Malamud-Smith
>Berkman Center for * Visit "Privacy in Cyberspace":
> Internet & Society * http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/metaschool
>
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