Harold,

At 09:50 AM 2/26/99 -0500, Mikki Barry wrote:
>>From: "Harold Feld" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>I find Dave Crocker's statement that the USG has no power
>>over NSI incredible.  Dave, do you believe that NSI submitted to
>>ICANN jurisdiction (before it was even settled what the shape would
>>be, essentially buying a pig in a poke) and agreed to open its
>>databases because it *wanted* to do so?

I fully acknowledge that my assessment is incredible.  The idea that an 
entity like the USG has no meaningful power over a situation like this is 
quite unimaginable.  Alas, that does not make the assessment incorrect.

Let me also be clear that my reference is to the administrative/regulatory 
responsibilities, exercised through NSF, Commerce and the White House.  The 
courts are an entirely separate matter.

When a series of negotiations work almost exclusively to the benefit of one 
party, then there is a practical basis for saying that the second party has 
no meaningful power.  When the one party makes concessions only due to 
other forces, then the second party cannot take credit for the concessions.

To whit:

The original commercialization effort worked only to the benefit of NSI, 
granting them a protected and exponentially growing revenue stream, 
charging a rate 5-35 times higher than necessary to recover 
costs.  Customers were, and continue to be, thoroughly excluded from the 
decision processes and most customers suffer accordingly in one fashion or 
another.

Internet processes entirely independent of the US government pursued 
changes to gTLD administration and were in the final stages of implementing 
those changes.  The changes would have created greater alternatives for 
consumers and forced NSI into a much more level playing field.  This was 3 
years ago.  Intercession by the USG worked to disable that change 
process.  The primary beneficiary of this has been NSI, and certainly not 
consumers or potential competitors.

The specific details of USG agreements with NSI have left NSI with no 
meaningful oversight.  The utter uselessness of the supposed technical 
advisory review is just a recent example.

A number of legal challenges are underway or remain a matter of serious 
potential -- where "potential" mean "threat" to NSI -- such as challenging 
its monopoly position or its actions taken to use that its leverage.

I therefore claim that the only significant pressures are from outside the 
USG and carry primary responsibility for guaranteeing that changes will 
take place.  In this context the behavior of the USG has been to frustrate 
and delay those changes, rather than to expedite them.  In effect, the USG 
actions have only made NSI's position better than it otherwise would have been.

One might, therefore, say this makes it clear that my claim is incorrect... 
because it shows that the USG obviously DOES have power: it has been highly 
effective in making decisions that improve NSI's position to the detriment 
of consumers and potential competitors, compared to the alternative 
decisions that would have been imposed on NSI were the USG not choosing to 
get in the way.

>>At the moment, NSI has a monopoly on gTLDs, and is dominant

Correct.  And that describes a particular market quite nicely, since it 
distinguishes "global" domain names from those names that have a national 
alignment.

>>player (but not a monopoly) in domain names.  It is unclear what
>>the relevant market should be.  POC/CORE/etc.  have consistently

Not sure what you mean by "the relevant market".  gTLD space can be 
discussed from a range of perspectives.  At this point what matters most is 
creating competitive activity in that space, so that the market can explore 
choices and find segments that it prefers.

>>defined "monopoly" on a TLD by TLD basis, thus the need to have
>>a shared registry to eliminate the monopoly.  I (and other supporters

A broad range of discussions have similarly concluded that the technical 
and operational realities at the base of domain name use mitigate achieving 
a legitimate competitive market, due to customer lock-in that occurs after 
the initial "purchase" decision.  This requires that the registry be 
operated with a set of checks and balances beyond simple market forces.

For any given TLD, there can be only one registry.  That registry 
inherently obtains undue control over those registered under the TLD.  That 
undue control need to be... controlled.

>>of proprietary TLDs) think this is to narrow a market definition.
>>This is like defining the market as "Coke" rather than as
>>"soda" or even "cola."

Supporters of proprietary TLDs see an opportunity for exercising the undue 
control to obtain undue profit margins.  NSI's history has provided an 
excellent demonstration that this concern is quite valid.

>>Even if it is a monopoly, it is unclear what the appropriate
>>remedy should be.  You seem unsatisfied with any solution
>>that leaves NSI has anything other than a smoking crater.

On the contrary, the original plan -- the IAHC proposal -- went out of its 
way to make concessions to NSI.  For example, the plan was not nearly as 
severe on NSI as the courts were to AT&T when breaking it up, which 
vigorously re-distributed AT&T's customer base among the competition.

It remains curious that careful criticism of NSI's performance and policies 
is viewed as somehow wishing NSI ill.  Why it is that desiring open 
development and review of strategic DNS operations policies and seeking 
legitimate competition, rather than some sort of ghost-version with a bit 
of competition appearance and no meaningful content, is a real mystery.

>>utilized by the Telecom Act of 1996.  NSI is being forced to
>>unbundle its registration services in the same way the RBOCs
>>are theoretically being forced to unbundle their network
>>elements.  This approach also worked well in the natural
>>gas market and the electric market.

In fact, NSI is not being forced to unbundle its services meaningfully.  It 
retains control over the registry and retains a remarkable amount of 
control over registrar space.  Best of all is that, as has been recently 
documented, the NSI "registry" gives special favor to the NSI "registrar".

>>Whether you think it is the correct approach is a point
>>that can be argued, but it overstates the case to the point
>>of absurdity to say that USG has not, and therefore cannot, taken
>>steps to terminate the existing NSI monopoly on .com, .org, and .net.

My position WOULD be absurd, if one did not have the minor reality of 
continued NSI exclusivity and utterly no new names or competition.  This 
condition has persisted for roughly 5 years.

The bottom line is that NSI's bottom line grows massively through a 
government granted and protected monopoly, charging excessive rates, giving 
mediocre service, and making major policy decisions affecting significant 
aspects of Internet operation without public review or control.

The bottom line is that consumers and potential competitors tend suffer by 
this process and NSI continues to benefit greatly.

The USG has been so consistently poor at doing its job of controlling the 
situation, so as to make it a practical reality that the USG is not the 
source of power for the changes that are taking place.

d/

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Dave Crocker                                         Tel: +1 408 246 8253
Brandenburg Consulting                               Fax: +1 408 273 6464
675 Spruce Drive                             <http://www.brandenburg.com>
Sunnyvale, CA 94086 USA                 <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

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