>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>From: Andrew Shapiro <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: Aspen Institute ICANN Review Panel Proposal
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>
>A s p e n I n s t i t u t e I n t e r n e t P o l i c y P r o j e c t
>
>March 1, 1999
>
>To: Various DNS-related lists (apologies for cross posting)
>
>In advance of ICANN's establishment of a formal Advisory Committee to
>consider proposals for third-party review of "decisions that may have been
>reached in violation of its bylaws" (see
>www.icann.org/icann-pr23nov98.html), the Aspen Institute Internet Policy
>Project presents below a preliminary proposal to achieve this end. We
>welcome feedback and hope the proposal will stimulate dialogue on the
>important issue of ICANN's accountability.
>_____________________
>
>ASPEN INSTITUTE ICANN REVIEW PANEL PROPOSAL
>
>(as posted at www.aspeninst.org/dir/polpro/CSP/IPF/ICANN.html)
>
>In November 1998, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
>(ICANN) announced that it would establish a mechanism for "independent
>third-party review" of ICANN decisions -- that is, review of decisions
>alleged by an affected party to have violated ICANN's articles of
>incorporation or bylaws.
>
>Below is a proposal to create a Review Panel to achieve this goal. The
>proposal grew out of the work of the Aspen Institute Internet Policy
>Project's Domain Name System Working Group and was drafted by Professor
>David Post in consultation with the members of the Working Group.* The
>Working Group offers this proposal for public consideration and welcomes
>comments and feedback.
>
>The proposal is based on the premise that a properly constituted Review
>Panel can serve as an important check on ICANN's exercise of its powers.
>Ultimately, the power of the Review Panel will be, and should be, derived
>from the persuasiveness of its decisions and the transparency of its
>decision-making. This proposal aims to create a Panel that has the prestige
>and incentives necessary to become a legitimate forum for independent
>review of ICANN decisions.
>
>The proposal does not try to anticipate, or solve, all the problems that
>are likely to be encountered during the operation of the Review Panel,
>among them the procedures it will adopt to cope with "frivolous" claims,
>the legal precedent it will consult to render its decisions, and the like.
>These matters are best left to determination on a case-by-case basis, and
>to the ongoing "dialogue" between the Review Panel, the Board of Directors,
>and the other ICANN constituencies.
>* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
>
>Proposed Amendment to ICANN Bylaws
>
>This proposal is designed to implement (and to replace) Article III,
>Section 4(b) of the Corporation's Bylaws (November 23, 1998 version), which
>provides that
>
>"(b) The Initial Board shall, following solicitation of input from the
>Advisory Committee on Independent Review and other interested parties and
>consideration of all such suggestions,adopt policies and procedures for
>independent third party review of Board actions alleged by an affected
>party to have violated the Corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws."
>
>1. There shall be a Review Panel consisting of nine (9) members. The number
>of members of the Review Panel may be changed by vote of 3/4 of the Board
>of Directors, but shall in no event be less than five (5).
>
>
>2. Members of the Review Panel shall be nominated by the Board of
>Directors and shall, when confirmed by a majority of the Members of the
>Corporation, serve for a fixed term of five (5) years. Each member of the
>Review Panel shall be subject to removal for cause upon the vote of a 3/4
>majority of the Members of the Corporation.
>
>3. No member of the Board of Directors, Officer of the Corporation, Officer
>of a Supporting Organization, or official of a national government or a
>multinational entity established by treaty or other agreement between
>national governments, shall be eligible to serve on the Review Panel. As
>used herein, the term "official" means a person (a) who holds an elective
>governmental office or (b) who is employed by such government or
>multinational entity and whose primary function with such government or
>entity is to develop or influence governmental or public policies.
>
>4. Any individual may present to the Review Panel a claim asserting that
>the Corporation has acted in a manner contrary to the Corporation's
>Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. The Review Panel shall permit the
>Board of Directors, any Supporting Organization, and any Member of the
>Corporation to present arguments to the Review Panel regarding the merits
>of any such claim.
>
>5. All claims submitted to, procedures adopted by, and decisions rendered
>by, the Review Panel shall be in writing and freely accessible to the public.
>
>6. Each claim submitted to the Review Panel shall be decided by a panel of
>three (3) members of the Review Panel. No member of the Review Panel with
>an interest in the outcome of any claim shall take part in consideration of
>such claim. Any decision rendered by such panel shall be reconsidered by
>the full Review Panel upon request by any Supporting Organization, by the
>Board of Directors, or upon majority vote of the members of the Review Panel.
>
>7. The Review Panel shall have the power to stay any decision of the Board
>of Directors until such time as the Board votes to overturn such stay.
>
>8. The Review Panel may adopt procedures as reasonably necessary to perform
>its functions.
>
>9. Funding for the operation of the Review Panel shall be provided by the
>Corporation. The Review Panel or the Board of Directors may, upon approval
>by a majority of the Members of the Corporation, impose such fees on
>claimants or other participants as it deems reasonable.
>
>10. Members of the Review Panel shall be reimbursed for the actual and
>necessary reasonable expenses incurred in performing their duties as
>members of the Review Panel. Any compensation for their services shall be
>determined by the Board of Directors, and shall not be less than the
>compensation received by the members of the Board of Directors.
>
>____________________________
>
>Aspen Institute Internet Policy Project's Domain Name System Working Group
>
>Izumi Aizu, Asia Network Research/Glocom
>Karl Auerbach
>Alan Davidson, Center for Democracy and Technology
>David J. Farber, Moore Professor, University of Pennsylvania
>David R. Johnson, Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering
>Lawrence Lessig, Harvard Law School
>David Post, Temple University Law School (Rapporteur)
>
>Andrew L. Shapiro, Aspen Institute Internet Policy Project (Chair)
>Dan Steinberg, Synthesis: Law & Technology
>Christine A. Varney, Hogan and Hartson
>Douglas J. Wood, Coalition for Advertising Supported Information and
>Entertainment
>John Wood
>
>* The Working Group grew out of a dialogue that began at a meeting convened
>by the Aspen Institute Internet Policy Project in Cambridge, Mass., on
>November 13, 1998, and then continued online with a few additional
>participants. The members of the Working Group listed here have expressed
>their general support for the proposal. Institutional affiliations are for
>identification purposes only.
>
>An online discussion space will be established shortly in order to allow
>for a full public discussion of these issues. Please visit this site again
>soon for more details. (In the meantime, comments can be directed to Andrew
>Shapiro.)
>
>Andrew L. Shapiro
>Director, Aspen Institute Internet Policy Project
>phone 212-998-6289
>[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>- - - - - Please feel free to forward where appropriate - - - - -
>
>
--
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will not have, nor do they deserve, either one"
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