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Eric, I have been following this very useful exchange between you and
Diane, and I hope you continue; it is helpful. One point I should make: a
very significant hurdle to any election process is the lack of money to run
it. It might well be a sensible strategy, especially at this stage of its
development, for ICANN to have some professional election help, but it has
no money to pay for that, and given the reaction of some to the effort to
generate funds through payments by registrars, the prospects for any
significant funds soon are not good. There is a serious catch-22 here
that for some ICANN critics is probably not coincidental: complain about
the lack of an elected Board, and simultaneously make it impossible to
generate the funds to elect a truly representative Board. I don't know
what the solution to this conundrum is, but there is no doubt that the
opposition to the creation of any regular source of funding is a serious
impediment to devising and implementing a credible At Large election
process.
(Embedded
image moved Eric Weisberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
to file: 07/15/99 01:09 PM
pic24124.pcx)
Extension:
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
cc: (bcc: Joe Sims/JonesDay)
Subject: [IFWP] Why fail on purpose?
A system can be designed to accomplish a purpose or to fail. ICANN must
decide
whether its purpose is to afford maximum diversity of representation or to
develop a
fool proof system for conducting meaningless elections (in the sense of its
expressed
representational aspiration).
Diane Cabell reports:
> The MAC recommended staggering the initial elections...
> Yes, we will miss the one and only chance to elect all 9 seats at one
> time...
> Yes, there will rarely be more than 3 directors up for election at one
time...
> Yes, one or more of them will be regionally designated,
> further reducing the potential for other minority interests to elect
> their preferred candidate.
AND,
> The MAC still recommends a form of
> preferential voting
Lets talk this through.
The MAC recommends that ICANN elect all of its proposed "at-large"
directors using a
form of preferential voting, but makes no suggestion on how that may be
accomplished.
Instead, it proposes a system in which it can not be done. It finds that
representation of diverse stakeholder interests/avoidance of capture is the
top level
concern, but concludes that we should not even try to accomplish that
purpose for
technical reasons!
What options might ICANN consider if it wants to work out the technical
bugs before
going live with "at-large" elections? Here are some suggestions off the
top of my
head. I suspect that members of this list can suggest other mechanisms.
1. ICANN can employ a professional election service to perform this
function;
2. it can experiment on something besides the real thing--hold some "dress
rehearsals"
before opening night (like a "straw" vote on which new gTLDs to add); or
3. it might hold a single seat election, first, and the rest of the "at
large"
elections three months later.
ICANN's failure to accomplish our basic aspiration is not in its stars.
The question
is whether it is in itself.
A system can be designed to accomplish a purpose or to fail. ICANN
must decide whether its purpose is to afford maximum diversity of representation
or to develop a fool proof system for conducting meaningless elections
(in the sense of its expressed representational aspiration).
Diane Cabell reports:
The MAC recommended staggering the initial elections...
Yes, we will miss the one and only chance to elect all 9 seats at one
time...
Yes, there will rarely be more than 3 directors up for election at one time...
Yes, one or more of them will be regionally designated,AND,
further reducing the potential for other minority interests to elect
their preferred candidate.
The MAC still recommends a form ofLets talk this through.
preferential voting
The MAC recommends that ICANN elect all of its proposed "at-large" directors using a form of preferential voting, but makes no suggestion on how that may be accomplished. Instead, it proposes a system in which it can not be done. It finds that representation of diverse stakeholder interests/avoidance of capture is the top level concern, but concludes that we should not even try to accomplish that purpose for technical reasons!
What options might ICANN consider if it wants to work out the technical bugs before going live with "at-large" elections? Here are some suggestions off the top of my head. I suspect that members of this list can suggest other mechanisms.
1. ICANN can employ a professional election service to perform this function;
2. it can experiment on something besides the real thing--hold some "dress rehearsals" before opening night (like a "straw" vote on which new gTLDs to add); or
3. it might hold a single seat election, first, and the rest of the "at large" elections three months later.
ICANN's failure to accomplish our basic aspiration is not in its stars. The question is whether it is in itself. h , i ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ������������������ �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� � � �� �� � �������������𠠤���� � �� �� � ����� � � �� �� � �������������𠠤���� � �� �� � ����� � � �� �� � �������������𠠤���� � �� �� � ����� � � �� �� � �������������𠠤���� � �� �� � ����� � � �� �� � �������������𠠤���� � �� �� � ����� � � �� �� � �������������𠠤���� � �� �� � ����� � � �� �� � �������������𠠤���� � �� �� � ����� � � �� �� � �������������𠠤���� � �� �� � ����� � � �� �� � �������������𠠤���� � �� �� � ����� � � �� �� � �������������𠠤���� � �� �� � ����� � � �� �� � �������������𠠤���� � �� �� � ����� � � �� �� � �������������𠠤���� � �� �� � ����� � � �� �� ���𠠤���� � �� �� � �����
