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>Subject: BOUNCE [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Non-member submission from [Andy Gardner
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>Date: Sat, 17 Jul 1999 20:28:27 -0400 (EDT)
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>>From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sat Jul 17 20:28:26 1999
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>Date: Sun, 18 Jul 1999 12:24:43 +1200
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>From: Andy Gardner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: Re: [IDNO-DISCUSS] Re: [IFWP] Why fail on purpose
>Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED],
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>At 11:28 AM +1200 18/7/1999, Dave Crocker wrote:
>>At 11:07 AM 7/17/99 , Andy Gardner wrote:
>>>ICANN - that's the supposed "open" organisation that is blocking the
>>>recognition of IDNO?
>>
>>Refusal to accept IDNO is hardly proof of being closed.
>
>Just one of a huge list of proofs, actually.
>
>>As Kent noted, there are some operational aspects to IDNO which should
>>cause any reasonable evaluator to question its legitimacy as a
>>representative body for the constituency it claims.
>
>Which operational aspects are these? As you have just stated that you know
>what they are (I assume you _do_ know what they are?), please list them
>here.
>
>>> >Password protection is amazingly naive.
>>>
>>>You haven't done your homework. Memebers are assigned a password by the
>>>system, not the other way around. You can set up as many e-mail address as
>>>you want, but you'd only have one that was issued a password.
>>
>>Your statement means that "email address" is not the "identifier" for
>>distinguishing between people. What is? What prevents one person from
>>having/using multiple such ID's?
>
>Why are you asking me? Just before you told us "there are some operational
>aspects to IDNO which should cause any reasonable evaluator to question its
>legitimacy" (FUD alert!). If you know what these "operational aspects" are,
>why are you wanting details on them? I say again, please list them.
>
>>The reality is almost certain to prove to be that a serious security audit
>>to the desig the design to be massively laced with holes and poor assumptions.
>
>FUD, FUD, FUD. You're full of it, Dave.
>
>"Almost certain to prove". Heh heh. Lovely. Have you got an automatic
>program that comes up with these gems, or did you buy the book?
>
>>1. Getting this sort of system design right is really a remarkably
>>difficult technical task, particularly for large scale use. Even if you
>>can fully prove the legitimacy of your 21-person system,
>
>21? Where this figure come from?
>
>>it will be quite
>>another task to prove it for 21,000-person use,
>
>The system scales quite easily. ICANN could have put on together using its
>preliminary cash injection and had a sizeable sum left over.
>
>>never mind the fact that
>>anything like this on the real Internet had better be design to work for
>>21,000,000, at least.
>
>The day 21,000,00 people vote on an ICANN issue is the day its "interim"
>board is finally replaced by a board that would legitimise ICANN.
>
>>2. Ultimately this sort of voting needs to stand up under scrutiny of
>>legal review and I believe there is, as of yet, no case law to support it.
>>
>>>Stick to your day job.
>>
>>It happens that Kent's day job IS network security and he's quite good at
>>it.
>
>The reality is almost certain to prove to be that there are some
>operational aspects to the above statement which should cause any
>reasonable evaluator to question the legitimacy of such.
>
>Gee, hang on, I might write that one down for future use. It almost sounds
>like I know what I'm talking about. I'm certainly feeling all puffed up
>with self-importance and hoping like hell that I've cast doubt in the minds
>of people that haven't got the time to do the research and find out that
>I'm full of it.
>
>>I have to work with experts in security and most of them are only good
>>at highly focused issues, rather than at looking at system-wide
>>concerns. Kent happens to be good at systems issues. Care to reconsider
>>you overly-quick dismissal of the issues he raised?
>
>Care to do you homework correctly? Care to stop making out you know
>"operational aspects to IDNO which should cause any reasonable evaluator to
>question its legitimacy" then later in the same email asking _us_ what they
>are?
>
>PS. It would be nice if someone could post this to domain-policy@internic,
>as I am not on that list and would like the chance to have my replies
>sighted on it.
>
>
>Andrew P. Gardner ZL2VOA 176.E 41.1S
>Wairarapa, New Zealand http://navigator.co.nz/andy
>Mediumwave DXer - Drake R8A
>http://radio.net.nz - NZ's Broadcast Radio directory
>
>
>
>
--
Richard Sexton | [EMAIL PROTECTED] | http://dns.vrx.net/tech/rootzone
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