Hi Hans, Nicely done. Jay. At 9/15/01 09:54 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >******************************************************** > CYBER-FEDERALIST No. 11 September 15, 2001 > > The Future of Democracy in ICANN: > A Critique of the > At Large Study Committee Draft Report > > > Hans Klein > Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) > http://www.civsoc.org > The Internet Democracy Project > http://www.internetdemocracyproject.org/ > ******************************************************** > >At ICANN's recent meeting in Montevideo, the At Large Study Committee >(ALSC) released its draft recommendations for user representation in >ICANN. [0,1] This document contains recommendations that may shape the >future of democratic governance not only of ICANN, but of the Internet >generally. Unfortunately, the document is deeply flawed. It abandons the >foundational commitments made at ICANN's creation and proposes to >radically reduce user representation in ICANN. > >I start by commending the ALSC for providing a useful analysis. The >report facilitates understanding of many issues surrounding user >representation in ICANN. Moreover, it confirms what is by now widely >acknowledged: ICANN's actions have public policy content. The report >notes that ICANN's decisions affect users in a myriad of ways that users >care about, including: "the potential use of IP addresses and domain names >for identification or location of individuals and groups," the >"competition and choice (or not) in the provision of various services," >"domain name intellectual property issues," and "practices of gTLDs and >ccTLDs."[2] Taken together, ICANN's policies in these areas constitute a >form of Internet governance. It is encouraging to see this acknowledged in >print. > >Despite these useful points, however, the report's core recommendations >are flawed in substance and in justification. If the recommendations were >implemented they would radically reduce user representation in ICANN: a >reduced number of board seats would be available to represent a reduced >electorate. The ALSC justifies these recommendations with inappropriate >principles of pragmatism (what can be implemented) and political >expediency (what the current Board will accept.) The ALSC ignores the >agreements hammered out in the 1998 International Forum for the White >Paper (IFWP), in which the U.S. government, the Internet user community, >and a wide variety of industry, government, and non-commercial groups >agreed on a set of bylaws for ICANN. The IFWP agreement was founded on 1) >the principle of equal representation of industry experts and users and 2) >an inclusive vision of users. The ALSC, by proposing that the ICANN board >unilaterally abrogate this foundational agreement, risks undermining the >stability of the Internet. > >In what follows, I analyze the report's substantive recommendations, the >justifications for these recommendations, and the principles and >justifications of the 1998 IFWP process. I conclude with some comments on >the stability of the Internet. > > >Substantive Recommendations >=========================== >Of the ALSC's many recommendations, three stand out. First, the ALSC >proposes to reduce the number of At Large directors from nine to six. >[3] This one-third reduction in user representation would end the balance >of interests on the board, leaving users in a permanent minority of 6 >directors on a board of 19. > >Second, the ALSC proposes a corresponding increase of representation for >ICANN's other constituencies. Stakeholders now represented by the three >supporting organizations (ASO, PSO, and DNSO) would increase their >directors from nine to twelve, thereby gaining a permanent majority of 12 >on the board of 19. These stakeholders would be re-categorized as >"developers" and "providers." [3] > >Finally, the ALSC proposes to drastically redefine At Large >Membership. The qualifications for voting would go from possession of an >Email and snail mail address to being the designated contact in a domain >name registration. (The proposed qualification for membership is somewhat >misleadingly called "individual domain name holder"; in fact, it restricts >the franchise largely to commercial organizations.) [4] This would change >the membership in number and character. Since there are far fewer domain >name registrants than users, the potential electorate would drop by an >order of magnitude. More importantly, since most domain names are >registered by organizations not individuals, this recommendation would >transfer voting rights away from individuals and over to >organizations. Significantly, most of these organizations would be >businesses: since about two-thirds of all name registrations are in .COM >or commercial domains like .CO.UK, the ALSC proposal would put most voting >rights in the hands of commercial entities. Finally, the ALSC recommends >attaching fees to membership, thereby creating a barrier to participation >that is especially onerous to non-commercial entities. The overall effect >of these recommendations would be to redefine the At Large Membership, >changing the definition of an Internet user from individual using the >Internet to a business operating a host computer. > >In their totality, the ALSC recommendations are radical: they would >effectively eliminate individual Internet user representation from the >ICANN board. Evidently, the committee took its "clean sheet" mandate to heart. > >Justification for Recommendations >================================= > >The ALSC offers three main justifications for its recommendations. > >First, the ALSC frequently invokes "consensus." The draft report contains >such phrases as, "we found no consensus support for the position that >...," "found potential consensus support for the notion that...", and >"there is an emerging consensus that ..." [2] However, nowhere does it >define the term. As readers may know, critics of ICANN have frequently >complained of the invocation of consensus to justify top-down >decisions. The draft report uses a similar rhetorical practice to justify >its recommendations. Absent a meaningful definition of the term, however, >this risks confusing readers into believing that a recommendation had >wide, verifiable support. This seems unlikely, since the ALSC "... found >it difficult to generate a high degree of interest in these issues." [5] >Invocations of consensus to justify recommendations seem to be without basis. > >A second, related justification used by the ALSC seems to be political >feasibility. The ALSC justifies its recommendations by noting that they >can win the top-down support of the Board. Here again the ALSC employs >the language of "consensus": "We believe the approach with the best >chance for consensus support is ... organizing ICANN along ... functional >lines of developers, providers and users, by defining At-Large members as >'individual domain name holders' ..., and by providing these At-Large >members with the opportunity to ... select one-third of its Board." >[6] Here consensus seems to mean political feasibility and board >approval. This justification also lacks merit. Since ICANN never fully >implemented user representation on the board, the body remains dominated >by industry representatives. The current board might be unwilling to >approve any recommendation that would allow Internet users to >counter-balance industry interests. > >A final justification for the recommendations is pragmatism: the proposals >can be implemented fairly easily. In particular, redefining users as >domain name holders is justified as a way to solve the administrative >problems of voter registration and authentication. The ALSC claimed that >the alternatives, most notably the snail mail authentication system used >in the 2000 election, "risks totally undermining the finances of ICANN." >[5] Such assertions are not without merit, but they are also not >completely convincing. ICANN pays very high staff salaries and legal >fees, so the admittedly high costs of snail mail authentication of voters >would be in line with these. The Markle-funded NAIS report has stated >that it believes ICANN can afford to continue using the system used in the >2000 election. [7] In any case, the gain in cost-effectiveness would be >accompanied by such a loss in user representation that this pragmatic >justification is weak. > >In summary, the ALSC has recommended radical changes to user >representation in ICANN and has provided only weak justification for >them. While the recommendations could be adopted by the ICANN board in a >top-down proclamation, they have no demonstrated support in the broader >Internet community and seem unlikely to attract such support. > >ICANN's Founding Principles: The IFWP >===================================== >Following publication of the White Paper in 1998, the US government >initiated an open, participatory process through which the Internet >community could achieve consensus on the design of what would become >ICANN. This process led to the design of ICANN to house the core >technical functions of the Internet (the IANA). Accounts of those events >are available from Mueller [8], Lessig [9], and Klein [10,11]. > >For guidance on today's questions about the At Large Membership, ICANN >should turn back to this founding "constitutional moment." Not only does >the IFWP provide concrete answers to questions of user representation, it >also offers a foundation of legitimacy for those answers. > >The IFWP produced the following agreements: > >Principle of balance: the IFWP produced a design for the Board of >Directors that is balanced between supply industry/expert representatives >and user representatives. This balanced representation between suppliers >and users is the keystone of ICANN's legitimacy. > >Expansive conception of users: the idea for user representation in ICANN >was developed by the Boston Working Group. [12] It is there that we can >turn to better understand the definition of user intended for ICANN's >bylaws. The BWG championed an open and expansive vision of >users. Furthermore, that open definition was adopted and implemented in >the election of year 2000. > >Due process: the two principles above resulted from an extended, global, >and participatory process, the IFWP "constitutional convention." While >that process was not without problems (many stakeholders on today's board >unsuccessfully attempted to move policy-making to closed forums,) it >produced the two principles above. The principles of balanced >representation and an expansive conception of users are founded on due >process. The results of that constitutional convention are binding on all >of today's stakeholders, including the ALSC and the Board of Directors. > >Conclusion >========== >The ALSC has recommended >* a reduction of user representation on the Board (from 9 to 6) >* an expansion in industry/expert representation on the board (from 9 to 12) >* a redefinition of the At Large membership that favors commercial >organizations >The ALSC has provided little justification for these proposals. > >The IFWP already addressed these issues in 1998. Its principles were: >* Balanced representation of supply industry/experts and users >* Expansive conception of users >The IFWP grounded these principles in due process: an inclusive, open >process whose results were accepted by all parties, including the >government of the United States. > >The ALSC recommendations to effectively disenfranchise users, and the >prospect of approval by the Board, must alarm anyone concerned about the >stability of the Internet. The stability of the Internet depends on the >professionalism of the men and women who govern and administer >ICANN. That professionalism must include a willingness to honor >commitments, to respect the rights of other stakeholders, and ultimately >to accept the rule of law. As the NAIS report notes [7], the ICANN board >has already re-written its bylaws nine times since its incorporation -- a >practice that European Commission official Christopher Wilkinson >characterized as "extremely cavalier." [13] The ALSC recommendations risk >carrying ICANN further down this path. This would be a disaster for the >Internet. Disenfranchising users and unilaterally abrogating the >commitments made in 1998 opens the way for unrestrained expansion of >ICANN's mission into additional areas of Internet governance. It removes >constraints from capture by the Internet supply industry and from >self-interested actions by the Board. It would fatally undermine public >confidence in ICANN. ICANN's legitimacy would be grievously compromised. > >The ALSC should thoroughly revise its draft report to eliminate conflicts >with the letter and the spirit of the IFWP agreements. Likewise, the >ICANN Board of Directors should reject any recommendations that conflict >with the letter and the spirit of the IFWP agreements. A unwavering >commitment to the rule of law is essential for the stability of the Internet. > >Hans Klein >Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility >Georgia Institute of Technology School of Public Policy > > >Citations >========= > >[0] ICANN Meetings in Montevideo: http://www.icann.org/montevideo/index.html >ALSC Outreach Meeting in Montevideo: >http://www.atlargestudy.org/montevideo_mtg.shtml > >[1] At Large Study Committee of ICANN, "ALSC Draft Report on ICANN >At-Large Membership," (27 August 2001). (Hitherto referred to as "Draft >Report.") http://www.atlargestudy.org/draft_final.shtml > >[2] Draft Report, "Recommended Membership Alternative," approx. p. 12. > >[3] Draft Report, "At-Large Membership Representation," approx. p. 17. > >[4] Draft Report, "'Individual Domain Name Holder' Defined," approx. p. 14. > >[5] Draft Report, "Letter to the ICANN Board and Community," approx. p. 1. > >[6] Draft Report, "Executive Summary," approx. p. 5. > >[7] NGO and Academic ICANN Study, "ICANN, Legitimacy, and the Public >Voice: Making Global Participation and Representation Work," August 2001, >"Executive Summary," p. >9. http://www.naisproject.org/report/final/execsummaryUSLetter.pdf > >[8] Mueller, Milton. 1999. "ICANN and Internet Governance: Sorting Through >the Debris of 'Self-regulation'" Info, Vol. 1, No. 6, >December. http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/muell.pdf > >[9] Lessig, Lawrence, "A Bad Turn for Net Governance," The Industry >Standard, 18 September 1998, >http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,1718,00.html > >[10] Klein, Hans, "On-Line Social Movements and Internet Governance," >_Peace_Review_, September 2001. Draft available online at: >http://www.atlargestudy.org/kleinpaper.html > >[11] Klein, Hans, "Cyber-Federalist No. 10: The Origins of ICANN's At >Large Membership" 27 March 2001, >http://www.cpsr.org/internetdemocracy/cyber-fed/Number_10.html . > >[12] Boston Working Group: http://www.cavebear.com/bwg/ > >[13] Wilkinson, Christopher, comments at ICANN Public Forum, Yokohama, >Japan, 15 July 2000. The full quote is: "I think it is a great mistake >to initiate the debate [about whether or how users should be represented >on the board through Membership At Large Board seats] on the basis of >by-law changes; the Board is increasingly giving the impression of being >extremely cavalier in changes to the >by-laws." http://www.tbtf.com/roving_reporter/icann1.html#11 > >### > >========================================================= > >CYBER-FEDERALIST is a regularly published series of analyses and >commentaries on Internet governance and ICANN. See: > http://www.cyber-federalist.org (archive) > >It is produced as part of the Internet Democracy Project. See: > http://www.civsoc.org > http://www.internetdemocracyproject.org/ > >The Cyber-Federalist is written by Hans Klein: > http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~hk28/ > >Subscribe to the CYBER-FEDERALIST! Send an Email to: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >========================================================= +++ Jay Fenello, Internet Coaching http://www.Fenello.com ... 678-585-9765 http://www.YourWebPartner.com ... Web Support http://www.AligningWithPurpose.com ... for a Better World ----------------------------------------------------------- "A new civilization is emerging in our lives, and blind men every�where are trying to suppress it." -- Alvin Toffler
