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Ulrika
------- Forwarded Message -------
Från: BREYER Patrick via DFRI-intern <[email protected]>
Datum: Den tisdag 24 mars 2026 kl. 07:09
Ämne: URGENT CALL TO ACTION: Stop the anti-democratic "Chat Control" re-vote –
Expose the Lobby Propaganda! (Votes: Wed 25th & Thu 26th)
Till: [email protected] <[email protected]>
> Dear friends,
>
> We are facing a democratic emergency regarding the EU CSA Regulation
> (ePrivacy derogation / Chat Control):
>
> Just weeks ago, the European Parliament bravely adopted a position rejecting
> indiscriminate chat control mass surveillance of private messages. However,
> in an obscure and bizarre procedural move, the conservative EPP group in the
> European Parliament are attempting to force a re-vote to undo this brilliant
> work.
>
> Why is this happening? Because MEPs are currently buckling under an
> unprecedented, highly coordinated barrage of lobby propaganda. An unholy
> alliance of Big Tech, law enforcement agencies, and
> industry-/government-funded child protection groups has manufactured a false
> panic to force mass surveillance through the back door.
>
> We have just hours to counter this massive lobbying effort. The Parliament
> will vote twice this week: tomorrow (25th) and Thursday (26th).
>
> 🗣️ THE CORE MESSAGE TO MEPs
>
> The legislative process is intentionally confusing right now. Give MEPs these
> exact, simple voting instructions:
>
> - VOTE 1 - Wednesday (25th): VOTE IN FAVOR of motion to remove the vote from
> the agenda. This motion dictates that the Parliament should not vote again on
> the ePrivacy derogation. The Parliament has already agreed on a democratic
> position earlier this month. Reopening it makes a mockery of the democratic
> process.
> - VOTE 2 - Thursday (26th): If Wednesday's motion fails, DEFEND PRIVACY. MEPs
> must maintain their original stance: scanning measures must be fully targeted
> (amendment 35).
>
> WHAT YOU CAN DO RIGHT NOW
>
> - Contact MEPs: Tell them to respect the Parliament’s original [11 March
> position](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2026-0070_EN.html).
> Use and share the tool fightchatcontrol.eu to easily find MEP email
> addresses.
> - Generate Media Attention: Issue press releases, contact tech/political
> journalists, and explicitly expose this attempt to undermine a democratic
> vote through corporate and police lobbying.
> - Use Direct Channels: If you or your organization have direct, personal
> contacts with MEPs or their staff, call or message them.
>
> 📢 AMPLIFY ON SOCIAL MEDIA: REPOST & SHARE
>
> To cut through the lobby noise, we need massive public visibility. Please
> repost, share, and raise awareness on your social media channels today.
>
> ⚡ QUICK SHARE: Please immediately repost these urgent alerts on your channels:
>
> - 🐦 X (Twitter): [Share this
> Post](https://x.com/echo_pbreyer/status/2035296556857839956)
> - 🦋 Bluesky: [Share the
> Alert](https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:qy2on5whae2qztxkx2jpzgkk/post/3mhkrrajyoyd2)
> - 🐘 Mastodon: [Boost the call for
> action](https://digitalcourage.social/@echo_pbreyer/116266597665909346)
> When drafting your own posts:
>
> - Direct citizens to action: Share the link fightchatcontrol.eu so the public
> can directly and easily email their MEPs.
> - Boost the counter-narrative: Share the facts exposing the lobby network. A
> great starting point is [this expose
> thread](https://digitalcourage.social/@echo_pbreyer/116205371224315359).
>
> ⚠️ KNOW YOUR ENEMY: EXPOSING THE LOBBY PROPAGANDA
>
> To effectively counter their narrative, you must know what MEPs are being
> fed. Here is the propaganda currently flooding MEPs. Use these links in your
> press releases and social media to expose their coordinated panic-mongering:
>
> - Big Tech & Industry:
>
> - Google: Pushing for derogation to avoid privacy compliance: [Google Policy
> Blog](https://blog.google/company-news/outreach-and-initiatives/public-policy/eu-lawmakers-must-act-now-to-ensure-the-continued-protection-of-children/)
> - DOTEurope: Directly supporting the EPP's push for surveillance: [LinkedIn
> Post
> 1](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/doteurope_policymakers-across-the-political-spectrum-activity-7439696045061767168-aKDm)
> | [LinkedIn Post
> 2](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/doteurope_it-might-sound-unbelievable-but-the-eu-it-activity-7440381873886834689-VQ96)
>
> - Law Enforcement: Police unions and agencies are pushing authoritarian
> framing.
>
> - BKA President: [Warning in Die
> Zeit](https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2026-03/bka-sexueller-missbrauch-kinder-jugendliche-warnung-chatkontrolle-ausnahme-endet-gxe)
> - Police Union (GdP): [Press
> Statement](https://www.gdp.de/bund/de/stories/2026/03/polizei-muss-befaehigt-werden-gdp-warnt-vor-auslaufen-der-csam-ausnahmeregelung)
>
> - Industry-Funded NGOs:
>
> - IWF: [Statement claiming "children at
> risk"](https://www.iwf.org.uk/news-media/statements/eu-failure-on-temporary-derogation-puts-children-at-risk/)
> - ECLAG: [Reaction to Trialogue
> breakdown](https://childsafetyineurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ECLAG-Reaction-to-End-of-Trialogue-on-Interim-Derogation-.pdf)
>
> 🛡️ AMMUNITION: DEBUNKING THEIR LIES
>
> - The "Blame Game" Lie: EU governments are publicly blaming the Parliament
> for negotiations falling apart. This is false. [This recent report from
> Netzpolitik](https://netzpolitik.org/2026/verlaengerung-der-ausnahmeregelung-rat-liess-chatkontrolle-verhandlungen-sehenden-auges-scheitern/)
> proves the Council knowingly and deliberately let negotiations fail because
> they refused to compromise.
> - The "Tech is Safe" Lie: Proponents claim their scanning tools are precise.
> Point to [this brand-new study from KU Leuven
> scientists](https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/pseudodna/) exposing the
> severe "structural weaknesses" and flaws in PhotoDNA’s CSAM scanning.
>
> 📎 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS FOR REFERENCE
>
> For your policy teams, here are the official links regarding Thursday's
> agenda and voting:
>
> - Agenda for Thursday:
> [Link](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/OJQ-10-2026-03-26_EN.html#V-29)
> - Voting List:
> [Link](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sedcms/votingList/(A10-0040_2026)_Sippel.pdf)
> - Amendments (29-36) to be voted on:
> [Link](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-10-2026-0040_EN.html)
>
> Please help now. Let's not let Big Tech and mass-surveillance advocates
> perpetuate Chat Control the phasing out of which is within reach.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Patrick
>
> My latest press release:
>
> The Battle Over Chat Control: How EU Governments and the Tech Lobby Are
> Trying to Overturn Parliament's Vote — A Comprehensive Fact Check
>
> This week, the European Parliament faces a decisive vote on whether the
> indiscriminate scanning of private chats and emails by US tech companies
> (Chat Control 1.0) will be allowed to continue. After Parliament
> [voted](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/historic-chat-control-vote-in-the-eu-parliament-meps-vote-to-end-untargeted-mass-scanning-of-private-chats/)
> on 11 March to replace blanket mass surveillance with targeted monitoring of
> suspects — thereby protecting the confidentiality of digital correspondence —
> EU member state governments let the trilogue negotiations fail by refusing to
> compromise in substance.
>
> Now, in an unprecedented manoeuvre, the conservative EPP group is attempting
> to force a [repeat
> vote](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/OJQ-10-2026-03-26_EN.html#V-29)
> on Thursday (26 March) to overturn the Parliament's principled decision and
> keep indiscriminate chat scanning in place. A preliminary vote on Wednesday
> will determine whether this repeat vote goes ahead or is struck from the
> agenda.
>
> Digital rights expert and former MEP Patrick Breyer outlines the urgently
> needed change of strategy:
>
>> "Indiscriminate Chat Control is like trying to mop up water while the faucet
>> is still running. It is technologically obsolete and a proven failure in
>> criminal justice terms. Flooding our police forces each year with hundreds
>> of thousands of hits from unreliable US algorithms — most of them either
>> false positives or long-known duplicates — does not rescue a single child
>> from ongoing abuse. This data deluge ties up massive resources that are
>> desperately needed for undercover investigations into actual abuse networks.
>> To genuinely protect children online, we need a paradigm shift: providers
>> must be required to prevent cybergrooming through safe app design and strict
>> default settings. Illegal material on the open internet and darknet must be
>> proactively tracked down and removed at source. That is what truly protects
>> children."
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Background: What exactly expires on 3 April
>
> An EU interim regulation (2021/1232), set to expire on 3 April, currently
> permits US corporations such as Meta to carry out indiscriminate mass
> scanning of private messages on a voluntary basis. Three types of chat
> control are authorised: scanning for already known images and videos
> (so-called hash scanning, which generates over 90% of reports); automated
> assessment of previously unknown images and videos; and automated analysis of
> text content in private chats.
>
> The AI-based analysis of unknown images and texts is extremely error-prone.
> But the indiscriminate mass scanning for known material — [proposed by
> socialists and
> liberals](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-10-2026-0040-AM-030-031_EN.pdf)
> — is highly controversial, too: beyond the [unreliability of the algorithms
> documented by researchers](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/486), these scans
> rely on opaque foreign databases rather than European criminal law. The
> algorithms are blind to context and lack of criminal intent (e.g. consensual
> sexting between teenagers). As a result, vast numbers of private but
> criminally irrelevant chats are exposed.
>
> In the run-up to the vote, US tech corporations, foreign-funded lobby groups,
> and law enforcement agencies are flooding public discourse with warnings
> about an alleged "legal gap." A comparison of their claims with internal
> documents, scientific studies, and the voices of child protection experts and
> actual abuse survivors, however, reveals an entirely different picture.
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Disinformation Narratives of Chat Control Proponents — and the Facts
>
> Disinformation 1: "The European Parliament is to blame for the collapse of
> negotiations and is putting children at risk."
> (Claimed by the [lobby alliance
> ECLAG](https://childsafetyineurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ECLAG-Reaction-to-End-of-Trialogue-on-Interim-Derogation-.pdf)
> and [US tech
> companies](https://blog.google/company-news/outreach-and-initiatives/public-policy/eu-lawmakers-must-act-now-to-ensure-the-continued-protection-of-children/))
>
> - Fact: It was the EU Council of Ministers that deliberately let the trilogue
> negotiations fail, for tactical reasons.
> - Evidence: [Leaked Council cables, classified as
> restricted](https://netzpolitik.org/2026/verlaengerung-der-ausnahmeregelung-rat-liess-chatkontrolle-verhandlungen-sehenden-auges-scheitern/),
> reveal that EU member states showed no willingness to compromise, fearing
> that any concession could set a precedent for the permanent Chat Control 2.0
> regulation. The classified minutes from 13 March show that the Cypriot
> Presidency already anticipated failure before the final trilogue round,
> noting it did "not expect to reach an agreement" with the lack of a new
> mandate given by member states. A majority including Hungary, Belgium,
> Sweden, Spain, Latvia, Slovakia, Malta, Estonia, Slovenia, Romania and
> Germany were unwilling to make any concessions on scope. Only a small
> minority of governments including France and Ireland agreed to the
> Presidency's proposal to phase out at least the most error-prone text
> scanning in search of "grooming". The Netherlands showed itself "completely
> flexible", and Italy had long before
> [criticised](https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5792-2026-ADD-1/en/pdf)
> the scope of scans and demanded "prior authorization of detection activities
> by [public] authorities".
> - Parliament's lead negotiator, Birgit Sippel (S&D), [sharply criticised the
> Council](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20260316IPR38230/child-sexual-abuse-online-statement-by-rapporteur-on-extending-temporary-rules)
> after the breakdown: "with their lack of flexibility, Member States have
> deliberately accepted that the interim regulation will expire in April."
>
> Disinformation 2: "Without indiscriminate Chat Control, law enforcement will
> be flying blind."
> (Claimed by law enforcement officials across the EU)
>
> - Fact: Targeted telecommunications surveillance based on concrete suspicion
> and a judicial warrant remains fully available after 3 April, as does the
> bulk scanning of public posts and hosted files. User reports also remain
> possible. The real problem for authorities is a flood of false leads and a
> systemic refusal to remove material from the internet.
> - Evidence — investigative chaos: According to Germany's Federal Criminal
> Police Office (BKA), nearly 50% of chat control reports are criminally
> irrelevant. This flood of data waste ties up massive resources desperately
> needed for targeted, undercover investigations into real abuse networks.
> Where investigations are opened, German crime statistics show that around 40%
> of suspects are minors themselves, often acting without criminal intent or in
> consensual situations. The [Federation of German Criminal Investigators (BDK)
> warns](https://www.bdk.de/der-bdk/was-wir-tun/aktuelles/keine-massenueberwachung-unter-dem-deckmantel-des-kinderschutzes)
> that this mass surveillance produces "a flood of tips… often without any
> actual investigative lead." Meanwhile, Europol and German authorities
> systematically refuse to proactively have abuse material removed from the
> internet, as [investigative reporting by ARD/STRG_F has
> revealed](https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/ndr/innenminister-darstellung-sexualisierter-gewalt-gegen-kinder-100.html)
> — images and videos remain online despite authorities being fully able to
> have them taken down, even as they demand ever more surveillance powers.
> - Evidence — failure to protect children: Mass scanning for already known
> images does not stop ongoing abuse and does not rescue children in acute
> danger. According to the European Commission's own [evaluation
> report](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/chat-control-evaluation-report-eu-commission-again-fails-to-demonstrate-effectiveness-of-mass-surveillance-of-intimate-personal-photos-and-videos/),
> no measurable link can be established between the mass surveillance of
> private messages and actual convictions. Yet the Commission and Council
> demand the extension of a measure whose effectiveness they themselves cannot
> demonstrate.
> - Evidence — risk of annulment in court: The European Data Protection
> Supervisor (EDPS)
> [stresses](https://www.edps.europa.eu/press-publications/press-news/press-releases/2026/extension-interim-rules-combat-child-sexual-abuse-online-must-address-shortcomings-and-prevent-indiscriminate-scanning_en)
> that any solution used to detect illegal content must be targeted and not
> indiscriminate. The Council's own legal service
> [concluded](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/st08787.en23-leak.pdf)
> in 2023 concerning the proposal for a permanent regulation (CSAR): "the
> detection order regime provided for by the proposed Regulation as regards
> interpersonal communications entails a serious risk that it would be found to
> compromise the essence of the rights to privacy and data protection enshrined
> in Article 7 and 8 of the Charter, in so far as it would seek to authorise
> access on a generalised basis, through automated and systemic screening
> surveillance, to the content of electronic communications and personal data
> of all users of a specific service, irrespective of their direct or indirect
> link with child sexual abuse criminal activities" (para 58)
>
> Disinformation 3: "The scanning technology deployed is highly precise and
> protects privacy."
> (Claimed by [Meta, Google, Microsoft, Snap,
> TikTok](https://blog.google/company-news/outreach-and-initiatives/public-policy/eu-lawmakers-must-act-now-to-ensure-the-continued-protection-of-children/))
>
> - Fact: The technology is an ineffective legacy system, error-prone, and
> destructive to the security of private communications.
> - Evidence — an obsolete model: Offenders can effortlessly switch to secure
> messengers where no chat control takes place. Due to the increasing adoption
> of end-to-end encryption by providers, the number of chats reported to police
> has already dropped by 50% since 2022. Most recently, only
> [36%](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0740)
> of reports from US companies originated from the chat control of private
> messages, while social media platforms and cloud storage services are
> becoming increasingly relevant. Rather than investing in targeted
> investigative work, the Council clings to a dying surveillance model.
> - Evidence — unreliability: A [recent international research
> paper](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/486) documents the structural weaknesses
> of the industry standard PhotoDNA. The software is unreliable: criminals can
> make illegal images invisible through minimal alterations (e.g. adding a
> border), while innocent citizens can easily be falsely flagged. In a
> [November 2025 open letter, leading IT
> researchers](https://csa-scientist-open-letter.org/Nov2025) (including from
> the universities of Aarhus, Leuven, and ETH Zurich) warned: "False positives
> seem unavoidable." According to an [open letter by a coalition of more than
> 40 civil liberties organisations and professional
> associations](https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/We-say-no-to-Big-Tech-mass-snooping-on-our-messages-CSO-open-letter-February-2026.pdf)
> (including Europe's leading digital rights groups), the Commission's own
> evaluation report confirms the measure's failure: the US algorithms deployed
> show error rates of 13 to 20 percent. Of the billions of messages scanned,
> only 0.0000027 percent were actually illegal material.
>
> Disinformation 4: "The call for Chat Control comes primarily from victims and
> civil society."
> (Suggested by the [ECLAG
> campaign](https://childsafetyineurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ECLAG-Reaction-to-End-of-Trialogue-on-Interim-Derogation-.pdf))
>
> - Fact: Actual survivors are taking legal action against Chat Control. The
> real driving force behind the campaign is a network of tech companies and
> lobby organisations funded by governments and non-European foundations.
> - Evidence — survivors speak out: Survivors of sexualised violence are
> fighting back. Alexander Hanff, a survivor and privacy advocate,
> [writes](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/why-i-dont-support-privacy-invasive-measures-tackle-child-hanff/):
> "As a survivor, I depend on confidential communication to find support and
> report crimes. Taking away our right to privacy means further harming us."
> Dorothée Hahne of the [survivors' association MOGIS e.V.
> warns](https://mogis-verein.de/static/media/uploads/eu_efa-greens-speech-mogis-hahne-28032022-en.pdf):
> "We see our safe spaces destroyed." To preserve safe spaces for victims, [a
> survivor from Bavaria is currently
> suing](https://freiheitsrechte.org/en/themen/freiheit-im-digitalen-zeitalter/chatcontrol_facebook)
> with the support of the Society for Civil Rights (GFF) against Meta's
> scanning of his chats. The civil society coalition also
> [warns](https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/We-say-no-to-Big-Tech-mass-snooping-on-our-messages-CSO-open-letter-February-2026.pdf)
> that indiscriminate scanning dangerously undermines professional
> confidentiality for lawyers, doctors, and therapists.
> - Evidence — lobbying: Who truly benefits from this legislation was exposed
> in an [investigative report by Balkan
> Insight](https://balkaninsight.com/2023/09/25/who-benefits-inside-the-eus-fight-over-scanning-for-child-sex-content/).
> The US organisation Thorn, which sells scanning software to public
> authorities, invests hundreds of thousands of euros annually in EU lobbying.
> ECLAG members [are
> supported](https://digitalcourage.social/@echo_pbreyer/116205371224315359) by
> tech corporations and the non-European Oak Foundation.
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
>
> The Alternative to Surveillance Overreach: "Security by Design"
>
> The European Parliament
> [advocates](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/posts/chat-control/#epmandate) a
> genuine paradigm shift, supported by civil society, survivor networks, and IT
> security experts: instead of indiscriminate mass surveillance of private
> communications using error-prone US algorithms, chat and messaging services
> should be "Secure by Design." This includes:
>
> - Strict default settings and protective mechanisms (Security by Design) to
> make cybergrooming technically harder from the outset and prevent the
> creation of CSAM.
> - Targeted telecommunications surveillance based on judicially confirmed
> suspicion.
> - Proactive search by a new EU Center and immediate takedown obligations for
> providers and law enforcement on the open internet and darknet — removing
> illegal material at source.
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Call to Action
>
> Civil liberties advocates are urging citizens across Europe to contact their
> MEPs directly ahead of the decisive votes on Wednesday and Thursday. Through
> the campaign page fightchatcontrol.eu, MEPs can be called upon to reject the
> undemocratic motion for a repeat vote and to uphold the fundamental right to
> confidential correspondence.
>
> Breyer warns:
>
>> "When a democratic decision is put to a vote repeatedly until the desired
>> outcome is achieved, Parliament itself is devalued. This approach sets a
>> dangerous precedent. It undermines the reliability of democratic processes
>> and sends the signal that majorities only count when they are politically
>> convenient. The responsible actors are damaging not only trust in the
>> European institutions, but the very foundations of democracy."
>
> On Tuesday, EU governments [will
> strategise](https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XXVIII/EU/64047/imfname_11593678.pdf)
> in a restricted format and behind closed doors on the issue.
>
>>
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
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