>From the article:

*>>For instance, we recommend using system monitoring tools that present
users with information about the last login attempt, so they can see if
they’re responsible for failed login attempts. <<*
Do they really believe that if users are inconvenienced by password changes
every 30 or 60 or 90 days, that they'll actually bother to match up their
activities with information that indicates last login of the system?

The fact that they could not point to an improved security posture by their
new stance indicates its weakness.  Let's see if they feel the same way
about it in 5 or 6 months.

The fact is, we are at a good point in computing history to go with
changing passwords, since so many online services are doing it.  Back when
people only had an eternal bankcard pin and a changing corporate password,
it would be easy to see how the changing password would be a huge annoyance.

Today?  Let's see how many users feel that identity theft is a worthwhile
trade-off for password changing convenience, after they experience the
former.

If user convenience is the paramount consideration for information
security, then it's hard to see what other authentication and authorization
options will be deemed acceptable.
-- Two-factor?  Inconvenient.
-- Digital certificates? Inconvenient.

Reducing the scope of exposure is the primary purpose of changing
passwords.

*>>The new password may have been used elsewhere, and attackers can exploit
this too.<< *
A. Pure Speculation.
B. There's nothing to prevent the current password from being used
somewhere else, too.  Frankly, if the next password a user selects is used
somewhere else, then there is an equal chance that they will use their
current password on the next service that they sign up for. They are just
employing poor password hygiene and they are not only going to do so if the
corporate password changes.


*>>The new password is also more likely to be written down, which
represents another  vulnerability. <<*
For any user that is likely to write down their next password, they are
also likely to be reusing passwords across sites.  See previous point.

This means that their poor password practices are *already* endangering the
current environment.


*>>New passwords are also more likely to be forgotten, and this carries the
productivity costs of users being locked out of their accounts, and service
desks having to reset passwords.<<*

Whine, whine, whine.  The deployment of a self-service password portal
eliminates this risk, and is not an uncommon solution.


What has been offered here is not a reason or a set of reasons, but a set
of ill-considered excuses.

Anyhoo, it will be interesting what their guidance is next year...



Regards,

 *ASB*
 *http://XeeMe.com/AndrewBaker <http://xeeme.com/AndrewBaker>*

 *Providing Expert Technology Consulting Services for the SMB market…*

* GPG: *1AF3 EEC3 7C3C E88E B0EF 4319 8F28 A483 A182 EF3A



On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 6:56 PM, Dave Lum <l...@ochin.org> wrote:

> Anyone see the debate on the Patch management list, driven by this:
> https://www.cesg.gov.uk/articles/problems-forcing-regular-password-expiry
>
>
>
> I don’t even know how it’s a debate other than the desired frequency (no
> one-size-fits-all on that IMO). Even six months is far better than never.
> With expiring passwords you at bare minimum mitigate employee’s that leave.
>
>
>
> *David Lum*
>
> *Systems Administrator III*
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