Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov(lumag) replied on github web page:

line 8
@@ -1346,9 +1346,7 @@ int odp_ipsec_in(const odp_packet_t pkt_in[], int num_in,
  * and content of packet data before the IP header is undefined. Use outbound
  * operation parameters to specify the amount of TFC padding appended to
  * the packet during IPSEC transformation. Options can be used also to create
- * TFC dummy packets. Packet data content is ignored in tunnel mode TFC dummy
- * packet creation as tfc_pad_len option defines solely the packet length.
- * In all other cases, payload length for the IPSEC transformation is specified
+ * TFC dummy packets. Payload length for the IPSEC transformation is specified
  * by odp_packet_len() minus odp_packet_l3_offset() plus tfc_pad_len option.

We require that an application sets `l3_offset` for all packet it pushes to 
IPsec. For TFC dummy packets it resulted in `l3_offset` being set but ignored. 
Thus I proposed this change. Other solution might be to stop requiring 
`l3_offset` for TFC dummy packets. 

> Bill Fischofer(Bill-Fischofer-Linaro) wrote:
> Should `0xa5` be a `#define` rather than a "magic number"?

>> Bill Fischofer(Bill-Fischofer-Linaro) wrote:
>> Nit: could use `odp_unlikely()` here.

>>> Bill Fischofer(Bill-Fischofer-Linaro) wrote:
>>> This change requires an API change as the spec says relevant offsets must 
>>> be in the range `0..odp_packet_len(pkt) - 1` .  Same comment for the L3 and 
>>> L4 changes in this patch.
>>> In theory the validation tests should test these bounds, but as with most 
>>> parts of the API violations simply result in undefined behavior, so this is 
>>> an "honor system". Still, we can't violate the spec here without changing 
>>> the spec.

>>>> Bill Fischofer(Bill-Fischofer-Linaro) wrote:
>>>> Unless it has been parsed, `odp_packet_l3_offset()` is initialized to 
>>>> `ODP_PACKET_OFFSET_INVALID`, so this seems an undue burden. The original 
>>>> wording seems cleaner from an application perspective.
updated_at 2018-02-22 08:45:31

Reply via email to